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Abstract 
Increased migration of people and ideas with developed transportation and communication 
technology across nation state borders creates a transnational space where new forms of political 
activism are taking place. Diasporas, which are identity groups with political and cultural orientation 
to their perceived homeland, construct identities and adopt ideologies from their country of origin 
and mobilize politically to affect events in their perceived homelands. The Kurdish diaspora in 
Finland is one of the most organized and active diasporas in Finland. Past research on the diaspora 
has been from the perspective of migration and cultural studies, but the diasporas’ political 
mobilization remains largely under-researched. 
 
This thesis approaches the topic from the perspective of peace and conflict studies and builds on a 
body of research that deals with conflict diffusion and diaspora mobilization that has focused on 
interaction between conflicts, diasporas, host and home countries. Based on previous research this 
thesis looks at how the Kurdish diaspora in Finland constructs social boundaries as part of their 
mobilization process. The data that is used is a series of nine semi-structured interviews with core 
members of the Kurdish diaspora in Finland. The data was analyzed using discourse analysis to 
distinguish membership categorization devices and to find in-group and out-group categories. 
 
The thesis suggests that diaspora organizations and core members construct and maintain a pan-
Kurdish identity that distinguishing itself from the Finnish majority. The core members construct 
boundaries based on political ideology within the Kurdish community in Finland. Two broad groups 
were distinguished in this study based on these categories: Apoists who connect themselves to the 
transnational PKK-movement and nationalists who maintain a more pan-Kurdish political outlook 
and separate themselves from Kurdish political parties. These two groups engage in outbidding where 
they gather support from Kurdish communities in Finland and from the Finnish civil society and 
decision makers. Their position to the host state affects the strategy of mobilization they adopted.  
 
The results point to need for researching further on ideological adaptation and Kurdish nationalism 
among the Kurdish diaspora in Finland as well as nexus between the notion of belonging, conflicts, 
diasporas and mobilization as well as cyberspaces where political mobilization is taking place.  
 
Key words: Diaspora, mobilization, conflict diffusion, social boundaries, membership categorization 
device, semi-structured interview  
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1. Introduction 
On September 13th 2014 the Islamic State of Syria and Levant (ISIL) besieged town of Kobane, 
predominantly inhabited by Kurds located in northern Syria by the border to Turkey. The offensive 
was followed by major protests by Kurdish protesters in neighboring countries as well as by Kurdish 
communities in Europe, as tens of thousands of people marching in the streets in Istanbul, Ankara, 
Dusseldorf, Paris, Barcelona and Basel. Over 25 people were killed in clashes between protesters and 
riot police in Turkey, two were stabbed in the Austrian town of Bregenz, where the small protest led 
into a brawl between the protesters and individuals from local Turkish and Chechen communities.1 
In the Dutch capital hundreds of protesters occupied the houses of parliament to demand the state to 
support efforts to defend the town from ISIL aggression, while in Stockholm Kurdish protesters 
occupied the city’s airport.2 The Kurdish diaspora in Finland was also mobilized, as protests were 
organized in urban centers with larger Kurdish communities3 along with hunger strikes that were 
orchestrated by a group of protesters in Turku.4  
 
The increased movement of people, wealth and ideas with the development of transportation and 
communications technology has created a transnational space where politics and conflicts take place. 
According to UN report on migration the number of migrants has increased globally from 173 million 
in 2000 to 258 million in 2015.5 Migrants and refugees from areas ridden with political conflicts may 
maintain their allegiances and by moving across borders forming transnational networks.6 Conflicts 
are not however solely ”carried” by migratory movements, but can be ignited or utilized by political 
actors who can build transnational networks to employ use of violence, which makes these spaces 
potential arenas for conflicts that transcend state borders, blurring the lines between internal and 
external security of nation states.7   
 
1 BBC, Syria: Kobane Siege Death Toll Rises to 500, 11.10.2014. 
2  Al Jazeera, Kurdish Protesters Occupy the Dutch Parliment, 7.10.2014. 
3  Matson-Mäkelä, Huoli Kobanin asukkaista kasvaa-Tampereella osoitetaan mieltä ISISiä vastaan,  Yle, 
10.10.2014. 
Hjelt, Yrjö, Suomen kurdit osoittavat mieltään terroristijärjestö ISISiä vastaan, Yle, 25.8.2014. 
 Raitio, Riitta, Kurdien mielenosoitus keräsi Jyväskylässä muutamia kymmeniä, Yle, 5.10.2014. 
4 Hjelt, Yrjö, Turun kurdit syömälakkoon, Yle, 6.10.2014. 
5 UN, International Migration Report 2017, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017, 4. 
6 Salehyan, Idean & Gleditsch, Kristian, Refugees and Spread of Civil War, International  Organization Vol. 
60, 2006, 335. 
7 Adamson, Fiona, Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and Networks of Violence,  Cambridge 
 Review of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2005, 33. 
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Although the term ”diaspora” has historically referred to the dispersion of Jews from biblical Israel 
as well other historical groups of people who have been forced to migrate from their perceived home 
country, scholars started to use the term from late 1980’s onwards to describe migrants with a political 
orientation to their country of origin. It was at this time that Western countries started to receive 
increasing number of asylum seekers from countries where political violence was taking place. 
Although the exact definition of the term has been debated in academia,  diasporas typically involve 
a level of organization in the form of associations or organizations formed by migrant communities 
which sought to maintain their distinct identity: this involves orientation to a perceived ”homeland”, 
as well as having a political aspiration to influence their homeland. 
 
Political actors can engage in the construction of identities to form diaspora communities that 
mobilize to support their cause. The construction of diasporic identity and mobilization process is 
affected by multiple factors, including political events8 and the stage and intensity9 of the conflict by 
international relations through the interests of parties involved in the conflict,10 by the context in the 
host country with it's political and legislative environment towards political activities, 11  social 
structures such as the immigration policies of the host state and the degree of discrimination,12 as well 
as by social-economic conditions of the diaspora members,13 and characteristics of the diaspora 
including it's size,14 age,15 membership composition16 and level of organization.17 With such a large 
number of factors, diaspora mobilization varies from each context to the next, and as such each case 
 
8 Kerlin, Janelle and Manikowski, Susan, Organizational Change in the U.S Afghan Diaspora A response to 
  Homeland events or Heightened Government Scrutiny?, Nonprofit Management & Leadership Vol 21, no. 4,
 2001, 371. 
9 Skrbis, Zlatko, The Mobilized Croatian Diaspora: It’s Role in Homeland Politics and War, In  Stares, Paul, 
 Diasporas in Conflict: Peace Makers or Peace Wreckers, United Nations University Press, 2007, 233-234. 
10 Shain, Yossi and Barth, Aharon, Diasporas and International Relations Theory, International 
 Organization Vol. 57, No.3, 2003, 451. 
11 Baser, Bahar, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts: a Comparative Perspective, Routledge, 2016,17. 
12 Wahlbeck, Östen, Kurdish Diasporas: A Comparative Study of Kurdish Refugee Communities, Palgrave, 1999, 
 143. 
13 Pande, Amba, Role of diasporas in homeland conflicts, conflict resolution, and post-war  reconstruction: the 
 case of Tamil diaspora and Sri Lanka, South Asian Diaspora, Vol. 9, Issue 1, 2017, 55. 
14 Baser, 2016, 180. 
15 Ibid, 25. 
16 Wahlbeck, Östen, Kurdish Diaspora in Finland, Diaspora Studies Vol. 5 Issue: 1, 2012, 55. 
17 Griffiths, David, Fragmentation and Consolidation: the Contrasting Cases of Somali and Kurdish  Refugees in 
 London, Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 13, Issue: 3, 2000, 281-301. 
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should be studied independently.  
 
The main focus of research on the relation of diasporas to conflicts has been their relation to their 
homeland.  Examples that could be mentioned are the cases of the Tamil diaspora, which maintained 
the conflict in Sri Lanka by supporting a conflict party with remittances throughout the 1980’s and 
1990’s and after 2001 became an important actor in the peace process;18 the Croatian diaspora, which 
mobilized as a response to the escalation of conflict in the Balkans and supported the Croatian military 
and police financially after the Croatian nationalists declared independence in 1991, 19  or the 
Armenian diaspora, which supported Armenian militia in the Krabagh region, contributing to eruption 
of the conflict.20  
 
However much of the literature regarding the involvement of diasporas with conflicts is descriptive 
in nature and as Bahar Baser points out, conflict diffusion through diasporas remains a field that is 
understudied.21 “Conflict diffusion” is a term used by scholars to describe process where conflicts 
and their effects are spread transnationally through a network of actors such as diasporas.22 More 
recent research has started fill this gap by studying how the conflicts are shaped by host land contexts. 
Fiona Adamson has theorized how diasporas mobilize as a response to conflicts in their perceived 
homelands,23 While Elise Feron introduced term ”conflict autonomisation” to explain how diasporas 
construct conflicts in their host countries, at the sime time also opening the discussion on the 
relationship between the host land context and conflict diffusion.24 For her doctoral dissertation Bahar 
Baser made a comparative study on how the Turkish-Kurdish conflict is manifested between Turkish 
and Kurdish diasporas in Sweden and Germany, analyzing how the host country context among other 
factors affected the conflict autonomisation process.25 Specific aspects in this theoretical framework, 
 
18 Fair, C.Christine, The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora: Sustaining conflict and pushing for peace, in  Stares, Paul, 
 Diasporas in Conflict: Peace Makers or Peace-Wreckers, United Nations University Press, 2007, 182, 183. 
19 Skrbis, 2007, 232. 
20 Tölöyan, Khaching, The Armenian Diaspora and the Karabagh Conflict, In Stares, Paul,  Diasporas in 
 Conflict: Peace Makers or Peace Wreckers, United Nations University Press, 2007, 116. 
21 Baser, 2016, 21. 
22 Carment, David, James, Patrick, Taydas, Zeynep, The internationalization of Ethnic Conflict, 
 International Studies Review Vol. 11, 2009, 67. 
23 Adamson, Fiona, Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization, in Checkel, Jeffery, Transnational Dynamics of Civil 
 War, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 67-70. 
24 Feron, Elise, Transporting and Re-Inventing Conflicts: Conflict-Generated Diasporas and Conflict 
 Autonomisation, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 52, No: 3, 2013, 364-365. 
25 Baser, 2016. 
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such as factors which influence the behavior of the diaspora in relation to host state and society remain 
largely understudied as does the study of interaction between diaspora groups.26 
 
The case of the Kurdish diaspora in Finland was studied by Östen Wahlbeck in his Ph.D from 1999  
Kurdish Diasporas: A Comparative Study of Kurdish Refugee Communities, in which he compared 
the integration and resettlement of Kurdish migrants in Finland and the UK. In his dissertation he 
focused on social mobilization of the Kurdish communities and found that by maintaining their pre-
migratory social network and also by organizing into diaspora organizations, the Kurdish migrants 
formed transnational networks.27 Wahlbeck noted that the diaspora in Finland, which at the time of 
the study was already organized into associations and organizations, mobilized according to social 
and political allegiances.28 He also noticed that events in the country of origin had an impact on the 
activities of the Kurdish the diasporas both in the UK and Finland as they were brought together in 
organizing demonstrations or other activities.29 Other scholar who has studied the Kurdish diaspora 
in Finland is Mari Toivanen, who has researched identity construction of Kurds in Finland using 
ethnographic and interview data and discovers that the diasporic identity is constructed in contrast 
to ”Finnishness” which is understood as a racial category,30 which results into  a feeling of belonging 
and attachment to Kurdistan that is facilitated by political activities.31  
 
However, the research on the Kurdish diaspora in Finland has studied the topic from the perspective 
of immigration research and cultural studies and has not been approached from the perspective of 
peace and conflict studies. Additionally there is a research gap with regards to political mobilization 
of the diaspora as well as the diaspora group dynamics that exist in Finland, although Wahlbeck has 
noted the presence of different political constituencies in Finland.32 The research however has treated 
the term ”Kurdish diaspora” as constituting the Kurdish migrant population in Finland in an 
essentialist way, or has only discussed Kurdish culture as a pan-Kurdish entity which has left room 
 
26 Feron, 2013, 363. 
27 Wahlbeck, 1999, 163. 
28 Ibid, 145. 
29 Ibid, 170. 
30 Toivanen, Mari, The Visual Lexica of (National) Belonging and Non-Belonging in the Accounts of  Young 
 Kurds in Finland, Nordic Journal of Migration Studies Vol. 4, No. 4, 2014, 192-200. 
31 Toivanen, Mari, Political Transnationalism as a Matter of Belonging: Young Kurds in 
Finland, in Ahponen, Pirkkoliisa, Harinen, Päivi, Haverinen, Dislocations of civic cultural borderlines: 
methodological nationalism, transnational reality and cosmopolitan dreams, Springer, 2016. 
32 Wahlbeck, 2012, 51-52. 
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to explore more closer on relation of different groups within the diaspora. 
1.1. Mobilization and Social Boundaries 
Identification is a process of social categorization where subjects construct social boundaries 
according to the categorization system which determines inclusion in and exclusion from social 
groups. 33  Adamson argues that diasporas which mobilize around conflicts in their perceived 
homelands strengthen the diasporic identity to gain support for their cause, 34  resulting to the 
construction of social boundaries with other parts of the host society. The way diasporas mobilize 
and adopt conflicts are affected by numerous factors from politics in the homeland, to the legal and 
political context in the host state and characteristics of the diaspora itself.35 As these dynamics 
change, also the way social boundaries are constructed change, as does the way the conflict is 
manifested through the diaspora.  
 
Though Toivanen has studied the topic of social categorization by the Kurdish diaspora in Finland, 
her perspective came from different theoretical framework as the studies were sociological studies on 
multiculturalism in Finland, and did not include a perspective on how social boundaries are affected 
by conflict dynamics, or by the mobilization process. Furthermore, the diffusion of the Kurdish 
conflict in Finland has not been studied so far, and in light of the Kurdish mobilization in Finland 
since the siege of Kobane in 2014 and changed dynamics regarding the Kurdish conflict, there is a 
need to look on how the changed conflict dynamics have affected the way Kurdish diaspora members 
position themselves in Finnish society.   
 
1.2.Construction of social boundaries by Kurdish diaspora in Finland 
The aim of my thesis is to study social boundary construction, which is a part of the mobilization 
process among diasporas. Thus my research question is ”How does the Kurdish diaspora in Finland 
construct social boundaries in it's political mobilization?”. I am expecting to find how Kurdish 
diaspora members position themselves in Finnish society and to what extent do they emphasize 
ethnicity or Kurdish exceptionalism as well as how they position themselves to different groups in 
the Finnish society and what kind of differences there are between different diaspora members. I am 
 
33 Karner, Christian, Ethnicity and everyday life, London/New York: Routledge, 2007, 48. 
34 Adamson, 2013, 67-70. 
35 Ibid, 366-367. 
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also interested in the diasporas relation to the conflict in their homeland and how the Finnish context 
affects the way the conflict is autonomised by the diaspora members in Finland.  
 
The data that I will be using are a series of interviews that I have conducted with core diaspora 
members.36 The data collection method was semi-structured interviews, where I had a series of broad 
questions about the activities of the Kurdish diaspora and Finnish society with the goal of getting the 
participants themselves to reflect on their own thoughts. I also had a set of sub-questions, which I 
used to reflect on specific issues that may arise during the interviews if the participants raise these 
issues themselves. By having a broad structure, I avoid having questions which are persuasive or 
which would include research bias and instead let the participants themselves narrate how they see 
things. With these longer reflective turns they will construct discourse units, which are segments of 
meaning that are constructed by the participant.37 The respondents are all core members of the 
diaspora as has been Shain and Yossi,38 which limits the perspective only to the most active in the 
Finnish society. Furthermore, the choice of Finnish as the language used in the interviews limits them 
to only those diaspora members who have a good command of Finnish a foreign language. Focusing 
on core members who are the most active group and who are the main facilitators and constructors of 
diasporic identity gives however a perspective on how the diaspora is formed and how do they 
position themselves in the host society.  
 
These discourse units can be analyzed using discourse analysis to code the meanings that are 
generated during the interviews. In the analysis I will be tracing membership categorization devices, 
which are social categories that indicate inclusion in and exclusion from groups.39 Discourse analysis 
will thus allow me to identify boundary construction mechanisms and understand the way Kurdish 
diaspora members in Finland position themselves in relation to different groups and actors in Finnish 
society, such as other diaspora groups or the Finnish state. By placing my findings in a larger context, 
 
36 Shain, Yossi and Barth, Aharon, 2003, 449-479. 
37 Have, Paul Ten, Understanding Qualitative Research and Ethnomethodology, Sage Publishing,  2004, 64. 
38  Shain, Yossi and Barth, Aharon, Diasporas and International Relations Theory, International Organization 
 (2003)  Vol. 57, Issue 3: 449-479. 
39 Baker, Carolyn,‘Membership categorization and interview accounts’. In: David Silverman, ed. Qualitative 
 research: theory, method and practice. London: Sage, 1997, 131. 
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I am hoping to understand how the host-land context in Finland along with international 
developments affect how the diaspora constructs social boundaries as part of the mobilization process.  
1.3.Structure of the thesis 
The thesis will start with the theoretical framework which will provide an overview of definition of 
the term ”diaspora”, the mobilization process and diasporas’, the behavior of diasporas, their relations 
to conflicts and the construction of social boundaries. I will also position how this thesis fits within 
current academic debates by defining the terminology that I will be using. I will then present the 
methodology used in this study by first going through the semi-structured interviewing method and 
looking at how this method can be used to produce discourse units while avoiding research bias and 
the truthfulness of responses. This will be followed by descriptions of the data analysis methods used 
in this study. Lastly I will present ethical considerations that were taken into account while conducting 
this study.  
 
Understanding the reasons for mobilization and the current context requires understanding of their 
history, which is why I’m including a background section in my thesis. In this section I will give an 
overview about the history of the Kurdish conflict and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe and in Finland, 
as well as about recent developments in the conflict. It will also help in placing the findings of this 
study in a wider context. I will then move into the analysis section of this study in which the data is 
analyzed according to the method described. It will start by presenting how notion of belonging and 
construction of the pan-Kurdish diasporic identity are manifested among the respondents through 
social categorization mechanism. The discussion will then move on to the mobilization process along 
with the political opportunity structures and role of the technology. This will be followed by 
discussion over conflict diffusion among the Kurdish diaspora in Finland. I will then present how 
different diaspora groups’ position within Finnish society affects the political mobilization of 
diaspora groups and lastly draw everything together in reflection on the findings on the theoretical 
framework.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Definition of ”diaspora” 
A universally accepted definition of the term ”diaspora” does not exist in academic literature. The 
word originates from the Greek word of ”speirodia”, which refers to migration and colonization40 and 
has been used traditionally to refer to Jews living outside the biblical land of Israel as well as historical 
dispersion of Armenian population from Anatolia during the first world war and Africans by 
Europeans during the trans-Atlantic Slave trade.41 The term gained popularity in the academia from 
1980’s when it was started to be used in social sciences to describe experiences of forced migrants 
who formed their own communities in Europe.42  The term overlaps in literature with concepts such 
as ”transnational community” and ”migrant group” and has been used to describe almost any 
transnational or deterritorialized group,43 which is why it is needed to review how the concept has 
been used in past research and to determine how the term in defined in this thesis. 
 
During early 1990’s the term was associated mostly with migration.  Khachig Tölölyan wrote in the 
first issue of Diaspora, the first academic journal that specializes in the subject that ”the term that 
once described the Jewish and Armenian dispersion now shares meanings with larger semantic 
domain that includes words like immigrant, expatriate, refugee, guest-worker, exile community, 
overseas community, ethnic community”.44 In the same issue, William Safran presented his definition 
of diaspora as being ”expatriate minority communities that are dispersed from original center to at 
least two peripheral places, that maintain a memory, vision or myth about their original homeland, 
that believe that they are not or cannot be fully accepted as part of their host country, see the ancestral 
home as a place of eventual return, when time is right, that are committed to the maintenance of 
restoration of this homeland to which the group’s consciousness and solidarity are importantly 
 
40 Cohen, Robin, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, University of Warwick, 1997, ix. 
41 Ember, Melvin, Ember, Carol, Skoggard, Ian, Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee 
 Cultures around the World Volume 1: Overview and Topics, Spriger, 2004, XIII. 
42 Wahlbeck, Östen, The Concept of Diaspora as an analytical tool in the study of refugee communities, Journal 
 of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.28 No: 2, 2002, 221-222. 
43 Adamson, Fiona, Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social  Movements, 
 In Mandaville, Peter and Lyons, Terrence, Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks,
 New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, 29. 
44 Tölölyan, Khachig, The Nation State and it's Others: In lieu of preface, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational
 Studies Vol:1 No: 1, 1991, 4-5. 
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defined by this continuing relationship with this homeland”.45 Bahar Baser pointed out in that the 
fixture on will to return by diaspora members have been discarded by later research as has the 
assumption on myth of a home country.46 Brubaker broadened the concept beyond migration in his 
study on Eastern European minorities after the fall of the Soviet Union, as he showed that diasporas 
can also emerge as a result of movement of borders.47 
 
Two opposing ways of using the term can be distinguished from literature which are essentialist and 
constructivist. Essentialist usage is based on assumption that migrants carry their national identity 
with them, and retain their sense of belonging to their homeland. This view holds that diasporas are 
a result of migratory movements and leads often to ethnicizing the concept of diaspora. 
Constructivists see that rather than just a result of migration movements, diasporas are social 
constructions, to which different actors, among them diaspora elite and homeland elite, have a 
significant role in constructing. The debate over the concept mirrors the debate in international 
relations literature about collective identities.48 Constructivist research on transnational networks, 
transnationalism and identity has placed diasporas at the center of migration, globalization, exile and 
boundary crossing from one political system to another, which provide a basis for re-construction of 
identity.49 
 
Robin Cohen was one of the scholars who criticized Safran’s original definition of the term and 
presented his own version by adding four points to Safran’s original 6: 1) ”groups disperse for 
colonial reasons or voluntarist reasons” can also be diasporic groups, 2) ”there should be more 
recognition of the positive virtues of retaining diasporic identity” 3) ”diasporas mobilize their 
collective identity” and 4) ”diaspora can be used to describe transnational bonds of co-responsibility 
even where historically exclusive claims are not strongly articulated”50 While being more inclusive 
than Safran’s definition, Cohen saw the concept as very broad, containing all dispersed migrant 
communities,  as he described diasporas as homogeneous identity groups.  
 
45 Safran, William, Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return, Diaspora: A Journal of 
 Transnational Studies, Vol:1, No:1, 1991, 83-84. 
46 Baser, 2016, 32. 
47 Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and National Question in the New Europe,  Cambridge 
 University Press, 1997, 6. 
48 Adamson, 2012, 27. 
49 Ibid, 33. 
50 Cohen, Robin, Global Diasporas: An Introduction Second Edition,  Routledge, 2008, 7-8. 
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In their 2003 article on conceptualizing diasporas to discipline of international relations, Yossi Shain 
and Aaron Barth presented a definition which attempted to take into account plurality of diasporas 
and frame it around constructivist use of the term. They defined diaspora as ”people with a common 
origin who reside outside of their ethnic or religious homeland, which can be real, symbolic, 
independent or under foreign control. Diaspora members identify themselves or are identified with 
other according to this homeland, and are entangled to politics of this homeland.”51 They also 
categorized diaspora members into core, active and passive members according to their activity.52 
While the definition takes into consideration plurality of diasporas and gives more agency to diaspora 
members themselves in defining their identity than Cohen’s definition does, it suffers from 
methodological nationalism, as it states that the diaspora members share a common origin that is 
rooted in soil. In his 2005 article, Rogers Brubaker challenged the homogenizing definition of 
diasporas by claiming that rather than being a group of people, diaspora is a claim or a stance,53 
defined by dispersion of space, homeland orientation to real or imagined homeland and boundary 
maintenance with preservation of distinctive identity from that of host-land identity.54 Thus, he saw 
that diasporas are not pre-determined, but are social constructions of diaspora members themselves.  
 
I see that essentialist view is problematic, as it regards diasporas as static and all-encompassing, 
resulting into not taking into account plurality of identities and affiliations within them. It assumes 
that all members of a given group are political actors, which is not necessarily empirical fact, as many 
do not join diasporic organizations or take part in diasporic activities. There is also a problem of 
inconsistency between pre-determined definition and how the diaspora members themselves define 
their identity. Thus, I adopt Brubaker’s 2005 definition, in that I see diasporas as an identity that is 
defined by dispersion of space, orientation to a perceived homeland of the diaspora and boundary 
maintenance to other identities.  
 
 
51 Shain, Yossi & Barth, Aaron, 2003, 452. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Brubaker, Rogers, The ’diaspora’ diaspora, Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 28 No: 1, 2005, 14. 
54 Ibid, 6. 
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2.2. Notion of belonging and home 
 
Scholars use term ”homeland” and ”belonging” to refer to diaspora members cultural and political 
orientation towards their country of origin or perceived cultural home. They are terms used to explain 
spatial disparity and blurring of boundaries set up by nation states, as constructivist research considers 
space not as an unchanging factor that determines cultural behavior, but as a product of social 
interaction.55 Appadurai Arjun coined term ethnospace to refer to group identities not as spatially 
bound because of increased movement of people that leads to reproduction of identities.56 
 
Belonging has been described by scholars as way of remembering in cognitive psychological sense 
where the sense of belonging functions to store and organize information.57 This ”mental map” is 
seen as being adopted through socialization from young age through upbringing and education and 
results into different cultures having their own varying organizing structures.58 It has also been noted 
as psychological state or a need that results from rootedness and rootlessness to a particular locality 
or group,59 as well as a mental health concept.60 Social scientists link the term to group membership 
as a feeling that connects it's members together61 but it's has also been presented as an alternative to 
the concept of identity in explaining how individuals position themselves in relation to collectives 
 
55 Kläger, Florian and Stierstofer, Klaus, Diasporic Construction of Home and Belonging, De Gruyter, 2015, 3. 
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and societies.62 Manifestation of belonging by individuals and groups is affected by interaction and 
environment, so in the case of diasporas their host society.63  
 
”Home” or ”homeland” of diasporas has been associated with experience of dispersion by the 
diaspora, who are forced to migrate and settle into a new and alien environment. For diasporas it is 
essentially object for their sense of belonging. Indeed, what distinguishes diasporas from individuals 
in exile is their organized activity in constructing ”homes” or ”homelands”.64 In diaspora context 
home can be a locality around which historical narratives of identity are constructed, but at the same 
time it can also stem from lived experience of migrants.65 Home in diaspora context does not 
however only have geographic meaning, but it should also be understood as cultural as well as 
psychological which means that the concept stems from transnational nature of diasporas.66 Notion 
of home is directly linked to processes of inclusion and exclusion and thus construction of social 
boundaries, which is determined by interaction with other groups as well as diasporas status in the 
host society.67 
 
Toivanen suggested in her study that notions of belonging and homeland among the second 
generation Kurdish migrants in Finland is underlined by territoriality,68 meaning that they expressed 
belonging to Kurdistan as a territorial entity as well as Kurdish culture. At the same time Toivanen 
distinguished civic and ethnic belonging, as she saw that while the respondents did express belonging 
as Finnish citizens, they were still deemed as outsiders due to ethnized notion of Finnishness.69 
Territorial nature of belonging among the Kurdish diasporas has been regarded as stemming from of 
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status of statelessness,70 as their belonging to transnational network,71 as well as a result political 
mobilization.72 
 
I refer to the notion of belonging as social-psychological experience of involvement in a group that 
is defined by socially constructed identity that it is attached to. The notion of ”home” or ”homeland” 
is object of belonging in diasporic identities and is a social construct that consists of subjective 
experiences as well as historical narratives and it is constructed through interactive relationship 
(processes of exclusion and inclusion) with other social groups. 
2.3. Mobilization process 
”Mobilization” of diasporas has been used in the literature to refer to the process of diasporas 
gathering support to conduct their activities. Fiona Adamson’s highlighted the role of modern 
communication and transportation technology in facilitating diasporic identity, but she also stressed 
the importance of political entrepreneurship in mobilization.73 On a similar vein, Rainer Bauböck 
argued that even though spatial dispersion is part of diasporization, the phenomena is not an essential 
result of migration, but of mobilization through construction of such identity. He demonstrated this 
with the example of Kosovon diaspora, which mobilized as a response to the events in the country of 
origin.74 Scholars use the term diasporic turn to describe the moment when the diaspora is being 
mobilized.75 This process is determined by political opportunity structures, which are structures that 
affect how actors are able to use political space. 
 
Political opportunity structures that affect diasporic turn include different legal frameworks set up by 
states in determining rights of people, policies pursued by host state (the state that hosts the diaspora), 
home state or homeland elite, international law and politics, relations between host and home 
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governments.76 The system of the host country affects how diasporas mobilize in that systems that 
are more open to diaspora activities and grant diasporas access to political decision makers and 
structures, channel their activities inside the states’ political system and it’s civil society.77 Gregory 
Brown suggested in his doctoral dissertation that political system of the host country greatly affects 
the form of political participation of diasporas as in more inclusive systems political participation 
happens within the system, than in more exclusive systems, where political participation might take 
a extra-judicial, or confrontational form.78 Thus, the host states have a major role in determining the 
political opportunity structures of diasporas. In some instances the host state may have foreign policy 
objectives where mobilization of the diaspora may be seen as beneficial, such as US’s role in 
mobilizing the Iraqi and Afghan diasporas prior to support it's foreign operations.79 
 
Opportunity structures are not static, but can change when host or home states change their policies 
or if their relations change in a way that would affect the opportunity structures. Attitude of public 
towards the migrant population in Western Europe worsened from 2001,80 which manifested as 
growing popularity on anti-immigration policies especially after the 2008 economic crisis. 81 
According to Bahar Baser minority groups reinforce their identity when politics in the host country 
becomes directly linked with their identity.82 This might be because diaspora organization offers a 
space to maintain a sense of belonging83 and also as diasporic organizations often work to further 
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rights and fulfill the needs of it's members.84 
 
Diasporas’ vested interest in affecting politics or conditions in their home country is part of diasporic 
claim and identity construction and as such makes relations towards homeland and transnational 
diaspora located in other host states driver of mobilization. Mobilization can happen as a result of 
activity of the diaspora elite, but also by homeland elite.85 Diasporas with different kinds of relations 
to homeland mobilize and act accordingly, although diasporas have not been categorized by the 
academia according to their relations with their homeland.86 However it has been noted that stateless 
diasporas, that is diasporas whose perceived homeland is not bound to an existing nation state, are 
more likely to be mobilized to support political movements in their home country than other 
diasporas.87 
 
I see that diasporas emerge as a result of active social construction, but are also of historical 
consequences of the diasporas perceived homeland and experiences in the host land. Political 
opportunity structures determine how and when the diaspora can mobilize. They are affected by 
political and legal contexts of the host countries, level of discrimination against the diaspora members 
and international politics.  
 
2.4. Diasporas as political actors 
Political opportunity structures also affect the activities diasporas organize, how they behave and how 
they position themselves in relation to other actors. Host state, diaspora communities, antagonistic 
states and international actors such as OSCE or UN form a web of actors which interact in attempts 
to influence reality on the ground. Transnational relations between diasporas, hosting states and home 
states is referred in literature as ”triadic relationship”. 88  This relationship makes diasporas 
transnational actors, meaning that their activities and behavior is not bound or defined by national 
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borders. In light of more recent research on diasporas’ relations with international institutions and 
organizations, the concept is not sufficient as it does not include this level of interaction.  
 
Relations between the diaspora and host state greatly affects the diasporas ability to act and it's 
behavior. Studies by Östen Wahlbeck and Bahar Baser on relationship between diasporas and host 
states have highlighted the effect of host state’s integration policy and context, including level of 
systematic discrimination, on the mobilization process and ways the diasporas acts. Wahlbeck notes 
that spatial resettlement of refugee communities affected how the Kurdish diaspora organized in 
Britain and Finland: While in Finland during the 1990’s the Kurdish population was scattered 
throughout the country, the organization of the diaspora happened on a small scale on a local level, 
in Britain where there was a great concentration of Kurdish communities in London, the level of 
organization was higher.89 Bahar Basers comparative study between Kurdish diasporas in Sweden 
and Germany notes that in states with public policies that strongly support minority communities, for 
example with public support to establishment of associations that support integration, diasporas 
organize more coherently under one group and practice their activities through public institutions.90 
Inclusive system also had an effect on the diasporas’ discourse, as diasporas in Sweden adopted the 
Swedish states discourse of multiculturalism. 91  In more closed system, which Bahars study is 
represented by Germany, which have more strict policy towards political participation of diaspora 
groups pushes the diasporas instead to work outside of state institutions.92 Exclusionary policies 
results into diasporas to position themselves antagonistic towards the host state, and adopting 
discourse closer to transnational political groups, than that of the state. 93  She concludes that 
citizenship regimes, openness to political participation and ethnic lobbying, multicultural policies and 
foreign policies of the host states affected to a large extend the way diasporas mobilize and behave.94 
 
Relations between diasporas and home states or homeland elite can affect both the behavior of 
diasporas and also of the home state or political elite affiliated with the diaspora. In their relation to 
homeland, diasporas can be passive as declared representatives of a state or a subject of action by a 
state, active as actors which influence events in the home country or reactive as they react to events 
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in their homeland.95 Home states might have an interest to affect the behavior of the diaspora to 
influence policies or conditions in the host state, or attempt to mobilize the diaspora to influence 
events in the home country.96 The relation between the diaspora and homeland can be asymmetric in 
a way where the homeland is dependent on remittances or support from the diaspora as is the example 
with the Jewish diaspora and Israel,97 or the Armenian diaspora and the Republic of Armenia,98 which 
will result into diaspora having a great influence in affairs of their home state. Home state or homeland 
elite may, in some instances have an interest to restrict the influence of the diaspora on it's affairs or 
display it's legitimacy to other states over the diaspora, as has been the case with KRG and the PKK 
affiliated Kurdish diaspora, 99  or the Ethiopian state which excluded diaspora organizations in 
participating to political affairs in the country.100 
 
Relations between the home and the host states of the diaspora can affect the status and legitimacy of 
the diaspora. One can take Turkey’s policy towards the PKK as an example, where it lobbied the EU 
to ban the organization, which affected the opportunity structures of the Kurdish diaspora as a whole. 
Turkey-relations’ strategic importance to Germany affects it's policy towards the PKK and the 
Kurdish diaspora.101 
 
Diasporas also interact with transnational actors, NGO’s and international institutions such as the 
OSCE, the UN or the European council when engaging in homeland politics. Diasporas can reach 
policymakers otherwise unattainable through these actors, although not many diaspora groups are 
able to reach these institutions.102 Interaction between diasporas and international actors can change 
their discourse and behavior in a fundamental way. This was demonstrated in Ann-Catrin 
Emmanuelsons study on networks of Kurdish diaspora organizations where this interaction changed 
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the discourse of the diaspora from nationalist based claims to a global perspective that was framed 
by human rights and advocating for individual rights.103 It also affected the way these diaspora groups 
operated as they adopted institutionalized ways of working, and specialized to certain issues which 
guaranteed stable funding from international donors.104  
 
 I see diasporas as actors that operate in domestic space of their host state, in transnational space in 
other and in international space with international institutions and organizations. Their relations and 
interaction with these actors has a major impact in their behaviour and position. Given the opportunity 
and capacity, diasporas can also have an impact to their home state or homeland elite, and policies of 
the host state as well as homeland.  
 
2.5. Long-distance nationalism, Transnational conflicts and diasporas 
The term ”Transnational Conflict” developed from 1990’s to counter nation-state centered discourse, 
or ”methodological nationalism” in social sciences about conflicts. The term came to refer to conflicts 
that flow through nation states or conflicts which challenge their sovereignty, meaning conflicts that 
exist within and outside boundaries of nation states and include actors that are not always, or primarily 
nation states.105 As has been noted above, diasporas are essentially political actors that operate in the 
transnational space and many of them have been or are involved also in transnational conflicts. There 
is a debate in the academia over emergence of conflicts among diasporas: to what extend are conflicts 
that emerge through diasporas extension of the conflict in the country of origin, or constructed by 
diasporas?  
 
Benedict Anderson introduced the concept of long-distance nationalism in his 1992 lecture in Centre 
for Asian Studies Amsterdam, where he elaborates on 19th century British historian Lord Acton’s 
observation that many of the contemporary nationalist thinkers established their national movements 
in exile, or otherwise displaced from their imagined homelands.106 Anderson saw that while capitalist 
economy pushed people to migrate from their ”indigenous” territories and when nation states 
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ethnisizes them, they are pushed to retain their ”emotional life and political psychology” in their 
imagined original homeland. They are able to maintain this connection closely with modern 
technology, which enables them to keep contact to events that become part of their everyday life.107 
He refers to Irish nationalists in Boston who supported the IRA, Jewish Americans who support right-
wing extremism in Israel and Canadian Sikhs who support the militant Sikh movements in Punjab as 
examples of ”fanatics” among long-distance nationalists. Although not all long-distance nationalists 
go into such extreme measures, they all share participation to homeland politics without 
accountability.108  
 
Long-distance nationalism has been used by a number of scholars to explain adoption of homeland 
conflicts by diasporas. Jolle Demmers explained that long-distance nationalism explains how 
conflicts are de-localized by diasporas, who by engaging with events in their home country through 
transnational media construct the conflict in the country of settlement.109 Paul Collier claimed in his 
report on policies to reduce risk for continuation of conflicts that because of long-distance nationalism, 
large diasporas increase probability of conflict perpetuation.110 Terrence Lyons argued in his 2009 
article on Ethiopian diaspora, that ”diaspora groups created by conflict and sustained by traumatic 
memories tend to compromise less and therefore reinforce and exacerbate conflicts’ 
protractedness.”111  In his study on the effect of Turkish and Kurdish media on construction of 
transnational conflict among the Turkish and the Kurdish diasporas, Kels Janroj saw that long-
distance nationalism among the diasporas plays a key role in maintenance of the conflict.112 He drew 
from Benedict Andersons Imagined Communities framework to point into medias role in constructing 
national identities.113 He concluded that in the case of Turkish-Kurdish conflict, the media creates a 
discursive conflict over meanings of nation, national identity and belonging to a particular group,114 
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which manifests itself in discourses of Turkish and Kurdish diasporas.115 
 
Fixture on the role of long-distance nationalism in explaining diasporas’ involvement in conflicts has 
been criticized in recent studies. Jonathan Hall pointed out that claims about protracted discourses 
among migrants have not been proven consistently by research, as there is also data that contradicts 
this argument.116 Devotion to homeland does not necessarily always lead to maintaining homeland 
conflicts, as activities that diasporas take can take many forms depending on host- and homeland 
contexts’ as well as mobilizing diaspora elites agendas. Diasporas may work both as ”peace wreckers”, 
as well as ”peace builders”, as empirical findings suggests that even diasporas which share the same 
homeland may take different goals and adopt different activities in relation to conflicts.117  
 
In regards to conflicts that are happening in home countries, diasporas may work as ”peace wreckers” 
by paying remittances in order to support an actor in the conflict,118 lobby public opinion or actors to 
support certain conflict party,119 or by recruiting people to travel to the home country to participate 
in fighting.120 As ”peace builders” diasporas have worked as mediators,121 sent remittances to support 
reconstructing of home country122 furthered humanitarian efforts during conflicts or in post-conflict 
situations123 and advocated for promotion human rights or other causes.124 
 
As Bahar Baser states,125 there has been a great focus in the literature on how diasporas attempt to 
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affect the conditions in their home country, which might undermine the historical reasons for 
mobilization and the question of why the diasporas mobilize the way they do. A lot of the literature 
which concentrates on the ways diasporas mobilize and act, does not regard why the diasporas act the 
way they do. As diasporas’ behavior in regards to conflicts in their home countries show, conflicts 
are not simply ”carried” as essentialist oriented views might present, but just like diasporic identity, 
are a result of both historical factors and a result of active social construction. Fiona Adamson has 
presented a mechanism how diasporas mobilize in response to conflicts in their home country: The 
diaspora elite initiate a transnational brokerage which links them directly to the conflict actors, they 
frame the conflict to appeal to certain audience and use sectarian outbidding to articulate the diasporic 
identity in line with the conflict.126 Elise Feron has categorized three ways how diasporas ”transport” 
conflicts from their home countries: Through discourse, which they advocate to general public and 
policy makers with demonstrations, lobbying and participating in politics in the host state, societal 
level with diasporas engaging in spatial and social segregation from people belonging to opposing 
side of the conflict and physical level, which means violent confrontation.127 Factors that influence 
conflict transportation process by diasporas include process of migration, relation to the country of 
origin, country of settlement, characteristics of the diaspora itself and external factors such as events 
in the international arena all affect the way conflicts are constructed by the diaspora.128 
 
Conflict generated migrants construct their identity in a way where the conflict of in their homeland 
becomes a structural element of their identity, especially if the migrants are faced with systematic 
discrimination.129 Different diaspora groups with the same homeland might have different views of 
the conflict, especially if these groups are affiliated with different political constituencies. 130 
Diasporas react to events in their country or origin, which may result into diasporas to reconstruct the 
conflict from their home country.131 Generational differences and size of the diaspora affects the way 
conflict is constructed by the diaspora. Studies by Andy Curtis132 and Nina Glick-Schiller133 suggest 
 
126 Adamson, 2013, 67-70. 
127 Feron, 2013, 364-365. 
128 Ibid, 366-367. 
129 Baser, 2016, 40. 
130 Stares and Smiths, 2007, 5. 
131 Skrbis, 2007, 234-235. 
132 Curtis, Andy, Nationalism in the Diaspora: A Study of the Kurdish Movement, University of Utrecht, 2004. 
133 Glick-Schiller, Nina, Blood and Belonging: Long-Distance Nationalism and the World Beyond, In S. 
 McKinnon and S. Silverman (eds), Complexities: Beyond Nature and Nurture , Chicago:  University of 
 Chicago Press, 2005, 303– 312.  
22 
 
that the first generation of migrants can socialize the second generation to adopt conflicts, who then 
reconstruct the conflict according to what they learn from their parents, what they learn from media 
and how they perceive the conflict according to other life experiences. 
 
Elise Feron highlights the multiple factors that influence emergence of conflicts among diasporas to 
show inefficiencies of understanding the process as a linear across contexts. She argues that conflicts 
among diasporas ”autonomise” themselves, meaning that the conflicts are re-constructed by 
diasporas.134 As shown in Bahar Baser’s comparative study on conflict among Kurdish and Turkish 
diasporas in Sweden and Germany, the country of settlement has a major impact on how the conflict 
automises among the diaspora. The study suggests that conflicts tend to be manifested more on 
discursive and societal levels in more open systems, as diasporas use political opportunity structures 
available for them and channel their discursive conflict through ”official” state channels.135 Host 
states policies that treat minority groups as homogeneous cultural groups allocate diasporas to pan-
ethnic blocks, which in Basers study is expressed through the example of Sweden where the diaspora 
groups segregated themselves socially from each other.136 Institutionalized behavior with internalized 
discourse of non-violence however can be argued to prevent the use of violence.137 The study suggests 
that more closed systems and higher level of discrimination would push the diasporas to a 
confrontational political behavior,138 though the level of segregation was not as high as in Sweden as 
groups were not organized to pan-ethnic blocks, but behind political movements.139  
 
I see that while long-distance nationalism as a phenomena does affect how diasporas behave, it's 
effect is not linear. Diasporas’ mobilization and position within the conflict is dependent on their 
opportunity structures, state policies, international affairs, events in the homeland, diasporas internal 
characteristics and it's relation to homeland elite. Conflicts are social constructions, which  are not 
carried by each conflict-generated migrant from one place to another, but are a result of historical 
factors and active social construction by different actors. Understanding why and how conflicts 
manifest among diasporas requires understanding historical background of the conflict itself, but also 
hostland context and characteristics of the diaspora itself.  
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2.6. Construction of boundaries 
As discussed above, mobilization of diasporas requires constructing a politicized identity. This often 
takes shape of ethno-nationalistic ideology, which is characterized by construction and maintenance 
of boundaries to other groups.140 Fredrik Barth first presented the concept of boundary maintenance 
in his 1969 book on social organization of ethnic groups, where he showed that identity groups firstly 
maintain boundaries despite changing members of the groups and secondly that cross-group social 
interaction is part of identity and boundary maintenance process.141 He sees that identity groups use 
cultural features to signal difference from other groups in their interaction.142  Cultural features that 
signal boundary and cultural characteristics of the members may transform even the organizational 
form of the groups, 143  meaning that they are tools for organizational vessels that are used to 
differentiate self from others and signaling membership and exclusion. Emergence of ethnic 
distinctions requires construction of categorization system and acceptance of principles to which 
those categories are judged.144 These categories are affected by interaction between the groups in 
specific contexts.145 Social categories such as boundaries are thus indicators for standards of behavior. 
Actors codify idioms by selecting signals to represent their identity and asserting values for cultural 
differences, while historical narratives and traditions are used to revive certain cultural traits.146 In 
cases where their security is dependent on communal ties, identification to that community becomes 
important and thus is explicitly expressed to confirm membership to the group, as weakening identity 
and membership would be perceived as a threat to groups’ security.147 
 
Barth touched on different types of contexts where ethnic boundaries work in different ways which 
he divided into poly-ethnic culture systems, where the system is composed of different groups which 
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maintain a large autonomy of each other148 and societies with minorities,149 where interaction is 
determined by dominant groups framework of statuses and institutions. 150  In these systems the 
minority elite which determines boundaries of their group may work in different ways by attempting 
to integrate into the dominant group, accept and accommodate their minority status while 
participating to the larger system, or to emphasize their identity using it to establish new forms of 
activities and patterns of interaction not formerly found within the system.151 
 
Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle elaborated on political behavior of identity groups in different 
political systems in their 1972 book Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability. 
They saw that existence of established social infrastructure such as organizations and mobilized 
resources, are well suited for deployment of political entrepreneurship, 152  which is essential in 
mobilization of support for political goals. In cases of group competition, Rabushka and Shepsle 
elaborated on Barth’s concept of social categorization systems, where political actors engage 
in ”outbidding” of reinforcing communal values of group identity.153  They argue that increased 
salience of ethnicity in politics, which means politicization of ethnicity, leads to ethnic outbidding in 
politics.154 This is why many community based political entrepreneurs, such as diaspora elites, seek 
to increase salience of ethnicity politics.155  
 
Donald Horowitz brought concepts of ethnicity and boundary construction and maintenance to 
conflict research in his 1985 book Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Adopting the social psychological 
framework developed by previous research, he saw that ethnic groups participation to conflict can’t 
systematically be explained with pure analysis of interests, but should be understood to be a defense 
mechanism that arises from affiliative relations, where a threat to these affiliations are met with 
anxiety and behavior to express membership to ones identity group.156 Inter-group conflicts are a 
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result of constructing a comparison system, where juxtapositions, dichotomous aspects of interactions 
and polarized behavior are adopted to create an antagonistic comparative reference pairing. 157 
Claiming of symbols is a tool to create a rituals to which status is determined and gain legitimacy 
where it is contested.158 Adopting symbols can distort to wider political morality, to make it difficult 
to deny political claims.159 This suggests that in ethnic conflicts, conflicts become competition over 
group status, where the status is regarded as a security interest. It is in fact, an extreme case of ethnic 
outbidding described by Rabushka and Shepsle.160 
 
Boundary construction and maintenance is part of formation of a diaspora, which by definition 
constructs a distinct identity from that of the dominant culture of the host state, but in cases where 
diasporas become involved with conflicts, construction of boundaries and engaging in political 
outbidding becomes a tool for political actors to mobilize support. As a result these boundaries are 
strengthened and claims are made more extreme. As stated by Adamson, extreme position is not 
however always the winning strategy, as mobilization strategy and it's evaluation has to be looked in 
it's context of for who the diaspora is attempting to gain legitimacy from.161 Mobilization process, 
boundary construction and maintenance thus has to be seen in relation to wider context of political 
opportunity structures available for the diaspora.  
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3. Methodology and ethical discussion 
3.1. Data collection 
I conducted 9 interviews with individuals who are or have been active in the diaspora by organizing 
events, demonstrations or other activities. This follows definition of Shain and Barth’s core members 
of the diaspora.162  The participants were contacted directly, or through a mutual contact. Some 
interviews were arranged with a help from Järjestöhautomo of the Finnish Refugee Council. 5 of the 
interviews were conducted with respondents from Helsinki, 3 from Turku and 1 from Tampere. They 
represent different degrees and forms of activity within the diaspora, but also different backgrounds 
in terms of age, gender, political background and area of Kurdistan where the participants or their 
families originate from.  
 
Recent scholarship on diasporas and long-distance nationalism has suggested the importance of 
transnational media in construction of diasporic identity and homeland conflicts among the 
diasporas,163 which has made cyberspace an important source of data in studying diasporas. However, 
doing interviews provides advantages in understanding the phenomena that is studied and especially 
in the case of diasporas which consist of groups and individuals with different affiliations and 
interests,164 as understanding the status of each member of the diasporas, their backgrounds and 
affiliations is crucial. Although the cyberspace is increasingly important platform for mobilization, 
relying solely on data that is available there has it's limitations in that the mentioned information is 
difficult to recognize in online sources without prior information about the users or websites and their 
backgrounds. My lack of skills in Kurdish language, in which most of the conversations online are 
taking place, also limits my ability to use such sources for this study. In interviews however it is easier 
for me to acknowledge the background and status of the respondent and to recognize their role within 
the diaspora, which would be much more difficult by relying solely on online sources.  
 
The interviews followed a semi-structured format, where I as a researcher conducted the sessions 
individually with each respondent. Language in which the interviews were conducted was Finnish. 
As the study focused on political mobilization process, the questions and topics that were discussed 
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during the interviews were related to political affairs as well as activities of the Kurdish associations 
in Finland. As my main point of interest were social boundaries constructed by the diaspora, I looked 
for membership categorization devices, which are social categories to which activities are attached.165 
Tracing these categories show how identities, social relationships and institutions are produced. 
Studying membership categorization devices enable me to study how and why members of the 
diaspora construct boundaries between different groups. The interview is an occasion where both the 
interviewer and the respondent engage in generating meanings.166 As such, interviews are not ”data 
gathering”, but ”data generating” occasions. Interviews are a good method for studying membership 
categorization devices because in this occasion the researcher interviews the respondent as a member 
of the Kurdish diaspora, which means that the respondent activates the social categorization system 
when responding to questions by the researcher who in this case represents the Finnish majority.167 
Membership categorization is essentially positioning the self into a wider world view that is orderly 
and moral.168 
 
In the interview situation two things have to taken into account: The first is research bias, as the 
researcher uses pre-conceived ideas (in this case based on theoretical framework that is being referred 
to in the research) to prepare the interview topics and questions, which can lead to interviews to be 
persuasive by steering the respondent to certain conclusions.169 The other problem that needs to taken 
into account is truthfulness of the responses, as the respondent may want to represent reality in a 
certain way.170 In my thesis, research bias is taken to account by giving more space for the respondent 
to express themselves by conducting the interview with a looser structure, rather than relying on 
specific questions or a survey which would involve filling in conventional information to specific 
questions. This will allow the respondents to produce ”discourse units”, as in these occasions the 
information is constructed by the subject themselves, involving respondents’ own story.  In these 
discourse units one party is the primary speaker, while the other limits him- or herself to limited 
questions.171 The goal is to give the respondent more space to generate meanings and to reduce the 
role of the interviewer. This also creates space for reflexivity to recognize tensions between theory 
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and the data that is generated.172  
 
As for the problem of factuality, I approach the interview from what Pentti Alasuutari has called 
specimen perspective, where also the interview itself is considered as material that is under study.173 
Goal of the analysis is not to examine absolute truthfulness of claims and statements, but to study 
their discourse, which means analyzing why those claims or statements are made and what they 
indicate about perceived social realities of the respondents. Thus, I consider that as the respondents 
assume their role as a member of the Kurdish diaspora, they may represent things in a way they ought 
to be from their perspective, that can be considered as membership categorization devices. 174 
Subjectivity of each respondents has to be taken to account in the data analysis process. This is to 
avoid representing the respondents solely as representatives of the Kurdish diaspora, but as 
individuals with fluid identity and world view and as subjects with varying roles and positions related 
to their sense of belonging and position in the society.175 This multipositionality of the interviewer 
and the respondents means that they can take different positions in the interview based on the 
interview situation which is mediated according to interaction between the researcher and the 
respondent.176 
 
Despite these measures, I still acknowledge that the structure of the interview and the interview 
situation itself as interactional occasion does have an impact on the data. Another limitation that my 
study has is the use of Finnish as the language the interview is being conducted, limits the lexicon 
and epistemology of the data by firstly to vocabulary that is available to the respondent, and as the 
data is translated to English, to possible contradictions between the original meaning of the word in 
one language and it's meaning on the other. This also excludes diaspora members who do not possess 
good command in Finnish language. The sample of 9 diaspora members is only a small fraction and 
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does not represent the full plurality of the Kurdish diaspora in Finland, but as core members of the 
diaspora they are the main actors who construct and facilitate diasporic identity and also work to 
mobilize the Kurdish community which makes them the most interesting group for this study. 
3.2. Data analysis 
I will be using discourse analysis to study in-group and out-group dynamics and membership 
categorization devices. In-group and out-group positions are positions that members of identity 
groups define their membership by comparing their own values, action, aims, norms and resources in 
comparison to other groups.177 Discourse analysis is used to code the meanings that are generated in 
the interviews. These meanings show the in-group and out-group positions which are indicated by 
choice of topics that are attached to own group (”us”, ”the diaspora”, etc.) and other groups (”them”, 
etc.), modality, rhetoric, use of passive or active tense (to emphasize or de-emphasize agency) and 
possible use of normalization (making things to seem culturally ”normal”).178 In discourse analysis 
attitudes are determined as discursive evaluations, meaning that they have certain social functions,179 
such as construction and maintenance of social boundaries.  
 
After categorizing data to in-group and out-group categories, activities and social meanings that are 
attached to these categories can be coded and recognized as part of the categorization system.180 As 
described by Baker, this process can be done in the following way: Firstly by locating the central 
categories that underpin what the respondent is saying, secondly by recognizing attributes and 
activities that are attached to these categories and thirdly making conclusions on what are the 
indications of these attachments by placing them on the larger context.181  
 
The process was conducted in a following way: I firstly categorized the data thematically to subjects 
that the respondents discussed during the interviews. I then moved on to distinguish in-group and out-
group categories, where I looked at how the respondents positioned themselves in the interview, how 
and to what they expressed a sense of belonging to and how did they discuss or describe different 
social entities. The categories were then coded according to associations that were attached to these 
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categories. The findings were then reflected on the theoretical framework of diaspora mobilization to 
recognize social functions of these categories and position. Thus, the aim of this data analysis method 
in this study is to firstly recognize membership categorization mechanisms and distinguish group 
positions that emerged from the data. 
 
The main pitfalls of discourse analysis is subjective interpretation of the data,182 which is why the 
data should not be analyzed in isolation but in the context of the interview, but also in context of 
world view that is constructed through meanings.  
 
The method adopted in this study has been chosen from the perspective of the research question as it 
allows to recognize dynamics of group interaction and boundary construction. Placing it at the center 
of the research design allows the study to look at the conflict is constructed by the diaspora and also 
it's effect on diasporas group interaction and position within Finnish society. With this method 
coupled with the theoretical framework adopted for this thesis, the study aims to add on to existing 
literature about the Kurdish diaspora in Finland by shedding light on political mobilization process 
that takes place in Finland. Furthermore, it allows to study diaspora group interaction that is not 
extensively covered by current literature on diasporas.  
3.3. Ethical considerations 
The participants were first inquired by asking their willingness to participate to the study with basic 
information about my thesis and it's aims. They were informed that they will remain anonymous in 
the study and that the thesis will be open to public after it has been published. The respondents had 
been informed about the subject of the study. The interview questions avoided possible subjects that 
could trigger any traumatic reactions, so subjects regarding experiences of violence or displacement 
were excluded. The data will be transcribed so that the identity of the participant can’t be traced 
through their name or title.  
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4. Historical context 
4.1. Origins of the transnational conflict 
Under the Ottoman empire Kurds were not tied to the sultans power by direct rule as most of the 
territories it ruled, but by making tribal chieftains dependable to the sultan.183 This gave the Kurdish 
territories a level of autonomy from the court of the Sultan. Crumbling of the Ottoman state in the 
early 20th century created power vacuums in it's peripheries. From late 19th century until the end of 
the First World War, several nation states separated themselves from the empire and at the same time 
major European powers with imperialist ambitions, the Great Britain, France and Russia, proceeded 
to divide it into their spheres of influence. In the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 between the Great 
Britain and France, issues regarding the status of ethnic groups within these territories was not 
discussed.184 However, as the war prolonged in the Ottoman front, the British worked to create 
Armenian and Kurdish buffer states between the forming Turkish state and British mandate state of 
Iraq.185 Despite promises to Kurdish notables, the treaty of Lausanne in 1923 between the Allied 
forces and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk dropped the provisions for Kurdish state186 and the Kurdish 
population was divided between Persia and new states of Turkish republic, the State of Syria, 
Kingdom of Iraq and Armenia. 
 
At the time strong Kurdish national identity did not exist and instead, their political identity was 
shaped by tribal allegiances. Michael Eppel has argued that nationalism did not develop in Kurdistan 
in pre-modern times because of it's geographic isolation, as it laid landlocked between pre-modern 
empires which prevented the spread of modern political thought, technology and economy to the 
region, because of slow development of modern middle class, because persistence of tribal politics 
and because of linguistic weakness of the Kurdish language.187 Indeed, although Kurdish nationalist 
papers were published by intellectuals in Istanbul and Cairo from late 19th century, their kinsmen in 
Kurdistan did not possess the same political identity.188 Rebellions such as that raised by Saykh Said 
in 1925, Saykh Mahmud in 1929, Saykh Ahmad in 1932 responses to furthering of state influence to 
Kurdish tribal affairs. Policies of suppression of Kurdish cultural expression was practiced by Turkey 
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in an effort to create a homogeneous Turkish state.189 Suppression of Kurdish particularism in the 
newfound Arab and Turkish states during 1920’s and 1930’s pushed more nationalist thinkers to 
move to Europe. London and Paris became the new intellectual centers for Kurdish nationalism.190 
Although the scale of migration from the country of origin to other states was small, the arrivals 
established the first transnational diaspora networks that worked to construct and maintain a Kurdish 
diasporic identity in the west and also to develop new political identity based on western nationalism. 
 
4.2. Struggle for autonomy 
The first Kurdish autonomous constituency was established by a powerful Kurdish chief Qazi 
Muhammad in Persia who was able to acquire resources and weapons from the Soviet Union191 and 
support of notable tribes to establish republic of Mahabad around the small town of Mahabad in 1946, 
where he established governance that adopted Kurdish as it's official language.192 Although short 
lived (the self-declared republic was suppressed by Persian army within the same year) the political 
experiment had a lasting impact on development of Kurdish political thought as the activists in the 
republic would become leaders of Kurdish political movement in Iran and Iraq. One of them was 
Mustafa Barzani, a head of one of the most influential tribes in Kurdistan, who had the position 
of ”defense minister” in republic of Mahabad.  Barzani founded Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
in 1946 as a nationalistic party which would pursue establishment of independent Kurdish state.  
 
Kurds from privileged backgrounds preferred to gain their education in Europe before returning to 
Kurdistan to become carders of Kurdish politics. Since 1950’s Kurdish students started to form their 
own associations in Europe.193 Studying in Europe gave them an opportunity to meet Kurds from 
other parts of Kurdistan and to exchange and develop ideas with each other. Thus, the diaspora had 
an impact on further formulating Kurdish nationalistic thinking outside of their country of origin 
where the Kurdish communities were still divided along tribal allegiances and cultural differences. 
The idea of common “homeland” among all the Kurds was thus imported194 by the Kurdish students 
who returned to their country of origin after studying in Europe and internalizing the nationalistic 
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discourse that emphasized national identity over tribalism. Through interaction with their host society, 
the diaspora adopted intellectual influences that it transferred to the country of origin.  
 
After the Second World War a new generation of Arab nationalists behind Gamal Abdel Nasser 
challenged the pro-western ruling class of their countries. In Iraq the leadership of the Arab nationalist 
movement headed by Abd al-Karim Qasim allied himself with the Kurdish nationalists headed by 
Barzani. 195  Barzani’s willingness to cooperate with the state and his status as self-declared 
representative of Kurds in Iraq gathered opposition from tribes loyal to the former Hashemite 
monarchy which revolted against him in 1959 only to be suppressed with the weapons Barzani had 
gained from Baghdad.196 Barzani was becoming too powerful for Baghdad as he prepared to declare 
Kurdistan independent from Iraq. 
 
Distrust between the new Iraqi political leadership and the Kurdish elite with mounted discontent 
among the Kurdish population due to large unemployment and continuing underdevelopment of 
Kurdish areas led to open revolt by KDP-affiliated tribal leaders.197 The Iraqi air force destroyed 
entire villages which caused significant civilian casualties.198 The conflict caused inter-communal 
violence as the KDP militia would round up and kill captured Kurdish police officers and soldiers 
unwilling to join their rebellion and collectively punish Assyrians for perceived cooperation with the 
government.199 The conflict between the Iraqi state and the Kurdish political leadership over the 
degree of political autonomy of the Kurds and land ownership started to define the relations between 
the Kurdish and Arab population, which meant that it started to take form of ethnic violence. 
 
The political instability and the failures of Barzani to secure more autonomy for the Kurds had it's 
toll on the Kurdish political movement. Two Kurdish tribal leaders Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad 
challenged Barzani’s dominant position in the Kurdish political movement and held a separate party 
congress in July 1964.200 This division was reinforced by the new Baath government in Baghdad 
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which attempted to split the Kurdish political constituency by supporting the Talabani-Ahmad faction 
in 1966.201 A new conflict between Barzani and Baghdad ensued. Barzani was able to gather support 
from political enemies of the Baathists, Israel and Iran, and was able repel the Iraqi state’s influence 
in Iraqi Kurdistan until the parties engaged in peace negotiations in 1969.202 In these accords the 
Mustafa Barzani was able to gain concessions of autonomy, full recognition of cultural rights as well 
as representation on a national level in military and civil service. Plans for economic development 
with infrastructure projects were planned to tackle the economic issues of the region.203 Despite the 
concessions political divisions in the Kurdish political movement remained as the opposition faction 
established Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 1975 to serve as an umbrella for growing 
opposition elements within the KDP.204 
 
Despite the newly found cooperation between Baghdad and the Kurds, question over the oil rich area 
of Kirkuk lingered and was not addressed in the accords. The Fault line of the accords was that 
Kurdish autonomy in local governance was based on demographics. The Ba’thist government’s plan 
was to nationalize the oil reserves of Kirkuk which it sought to secure by resettling Arabs to Kirkuk. 
Plans to nationalize the oil fields brought support from the US to Barzani, who also established good 
relation with Israel, the main rival of Iraq in the region.205 During the 1970’s Iran became the main 
sponsor of Kurdish opposition movement in Iraq because of the two countries’ disputes over 
territories concerning the use of the Shatt al-Arab river for shipment of oil.206 Iraq’s offensive in it's 
northern border was part of continuing territorial conflict between Iraq and Iran their troops clashed 
in border skirmishes.207The Iraqi military created ”security belt” along it's northern border to prevent 
Kurdish guerrilla troops from moving between the Iranian and Turkish borders and in the process 
razed villages and deported over 600 000 people from their homes.208  
 
The Kurdish diasporas transnational network in the west that was established by the upper-class 
Kurdish migrants formed Kurdish Students’ Society in Europe (KSSE) which developed into the 
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main diaspora organization with branches in several countries,209 which ran 16 chapters that had 
approximately 3000 members by mid 1970’s.210 The KSSE worked to accommodate Kurdish national 
identity with cultural activities such as celebration of the Kurdish new year Newroz, producing 
Kurdish language publications and later organizing Kurdish literature classes to spread Kurdish 
literacy among the Kurdish migrant population in Europe. 211  Thus, from 1970’s the main 
organizational backbone of the transnational Kurdish diaspora was formed that worked to 
accommodate and construct Kurdish diasporic identity in Europe. The organizations adopted a 
transnational outlook in that rather than emphasizing culture of a specific region in Kurdistan they 
embraced sense of belonging to a single Kurdish culture.  
 
Increasing number of Kurds from less privileged backgrounds arrived to Western Europe, particularly 
to Germany through guest worker program that the country signed with Turkey in 1961. The guest 
worker program was a balancing act by several northern European states which had a severe labor 
shortage and states in southern Europe, Turkey and North Africa with large unemployment following 
the Second World War. Many of the people arriving from Turkey were from rural background212 and, 
as according to the agreement, worked in positions which required few skills or qualifications such 
as industrial labor. Many of them decided to leave their homes in Eastern Turkey because of the 
volatile political situation.213 The guest workers would form communities in businesses and mosques 
where they met regularly with people from similar backgrounds to discuss about politics and daily 
events.214 As these migrants came into contact with the political Kurdish students associations with 
nationalist Kurdish ideology, they re-constructed their political identity from localized to broader 
transnational Kurdish identity.215 Sweden had a policy of helping it's migrant population in settling 
to the country by actively supporting culture of migrants by granting public support for language and 
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cultural education. Publicly supported education of Kurdish language started in 1975216 while support 
for Kurdish literature and other cultural forms made Sweden the center for Kurdish intelligentsia in 
the diaspora.217 
 
Like in Iraq during the 1960’s and 1970’s, in Turkey many dispossessed young Kurds started to look 
towards leftist ideologies to solve the issues in Kurdistan: lack of development, cultural suppression 
and above all socioeconomic inequality. Throughout the decade Turkey’s domestic politics were in a 
deadlock. Political parties across the spectrum from leftists to far-right nationalists were unable to 
win sufficient majority in elections nor form working coalitions.  Growing state bureaucracy’s 
partisanship to different political constituencies further radicalized the political movements. 218 
Radical leftist students established paramilitaries to bring about a socialist revolution in Turkey, 
inspired by Maoism and Leninism.219 The radical Turkish left adopted problems of the Kurds as part 
of their agenda.220 The extreme Nationalist Action Party’s (MHP) youth wing created their own 
paramilitary to intimidate growing leftist tendencies in campuses and in the streets.221  
 
One of the radicalized youth was Abdullah Öcalan, a law student in Ankara. After released from 
detention in 1974 for belonging to The Popular Liberation Party of Turkey, one of the radical break-
offs of the Turkish Workers Party, he formed a political movement based on Marxist-Leninism. With 
a small group of radicalized leftist Kurds, Öcalan founded the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) to 
initiate a socialist revolution in Kurdistan. In his original ideology during the founding of the party 
Öcalan combined the idea of Kurdish national struggle with contemporary leftist framework of 
struggle against colonialism and class war.222 The PKK recognized violence as a legitimate form of 
furthering it's aims and recognized the Turkish state, right wing paramilitaries and land owning class 
in Kurdistan as it's enemies.223  
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4.3. Civil war in Kurdistan 
The revolution of Iran in 1979 sparked tensions between Saddam Husseins Iraq and Islamic 
leadership of Iran, which sought to spread it's revolution among Iraq’s Shia population.224  The 
Ba’athist government was expecting an opportunity to retaliate for the 1975 Algiers agreement and 
reclaim it's influence to the disputed territories.225 In September 1980 Saddam attacked Iran in an 
attempt to utilize internal instability in the country. The conflict reflected on to different Kurdish 
factions. Different states supported different Kurdish militias to weaken their rivals in the region.  
 
As the war between Iraq and Iran intensified, another military coup took place in Turkey in 1980. 
Suppression of different political groups that the military saw as a threat to sovereignty of the Turkish 
state or it's Kemalist character ensued. Around 122 000 people were detained for their political 
activities from different political groups, majority of them leftist.226 The PKK leadership was able to 
escape to Syria with blessing from al-Assad who saw support to the Kurdish guerrillas as an 
opportunity to weaken Turkey. Syrias dispute with Turkey was over Ataturk dam project which 
threatened Syrias self-sufficiency over water.227 The PKK then entered a guerrilla war against the 
Turkish state, using bases in Syria and Iraq. Turkish state created a system of voluntary village guards, 
where villagers and local leaders would get compensation for organizing militias in villages against 
guerrillas. As the socioeconomic problems of the region had not been addressed, it was a way for 
many common villagers to earn their living and landowners to accumulate power.228 This created 
conditions for violence between the Turkish military and the PKK, where both sides committed 
atrocities against civilian population. 229  The Turkish military initiated brutal ”capture and kill” 
operations, which terrorized civilian population perceived as sympathetic to the PKK, which 
increased PKK’s popularity as it represented itself as a guardian against the Turkish state.230  
 
Intensification of conflict in the countries of origin with outbreak of the Iran Iraq war in 1980 and the 
Turkish coup in the same year led to massive displacement of people in Iraq, Iran and Turkey. By 
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mid-1980’s half-a-million people were resettled to Europe and North America through UN 
resettlement program, mostly to Britain and Germany.231 Many of the refugees were Kurds who were 
fleeing political persecution and brought with them a strong sense of injustice. At the same time the 
PKK reformed itself to an organization capable of rally enough support and resources to wage war 
against the Turkish state. It was divided into the party which was to work as the main administrative 
structure, the popular army, which was the militia and the popular front, that worked as the network 
to mobilize support domestically and abroad through PKK affiliated organizations in Europe and 
elsewhere.232 The PKK’s reach was stretched to all European countries with considerable Kurdish 
population by the end of 1989.233 PKK politicized cultural traditions, most notably celebration of 
Newroz, the Kurdish New Year, to construct political identity based on Kurdishness.234 This was a 
systematic effort by the political elite in the homeland to influence the diaspora in order to pursue 
goals in the conflict. It has been estimated that more than seven thousand PKK-affiliated activists 
went to Europe to facilitate the discourse among the migrant communities.235 The ideology and with 
it the conflict was transported by the political elite of the party to the diasporas.  
 
The arrival of refugees and extension of the PKK’s and other Kurdish parties’ activities to Europe 
communities in Europe politicized the diaspora communities. The activities of diaspora organizations 
started to involve public demonstrations to raise awareness about the Kurdish issues in their country 
of settlement.236  Political revival among second generation Kurds in particular Germany was a 
reaction to racism that the Kurds experienced from late 1980’s as economic crisis hit the re-unified 
Germany.237 Apart from Sweden, Kurds now strived to gain recognition as Kurds rather than Turks 
in their host countries.238 Taking part in diasporic activities filled a sense of belonging and purpose 
among many Kurdish youth, who had hard time integrating to the societies in Europe.239 The PKK 
was able to use socioeconomic problems faced by migrant communities in Europe in their 
mobilization for support. 
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The Kurdish diaspora groups have engaged in boundary construction and maintenance in their 
political activities, as well as outbidding as well. By politicizing cultural symbols and practices, the 
PKK claimed cultural symbols to affect wider political morality among Kurdish diaspora and during 
the 1990’s it went to extreme measures in political outbidding with use of violence against Turkish 
community and diaspora, 240  which it regarded as antagonistic. The PKK-affiliated groups 
demonstrated power by adopting a hostile stance towards host states241 and by the use of violence 
against other Kurdish diaspora groups.242 The German authorities took a hard line against the PKK 
from 1987 as the organization was labeled as a criminal organization.243 The use of violence at the 
time has to be understood in it's context where not only did the conflict in Kurdistan had an effect on 
the diaspora, but also in the host-land context where the diaspora was pushed to fringes of the German 
society and the Kurds were faced with systematic discrimination from the German public, which 
affected the strategy of mobilization.244 The closed system did not provide official channels for the 
political activism of the diaspora which pushed them to fringes of the society and contributed to 
manifestation of the conflict in violent form. 
 
The PKK was the most successful Kurdish political constituency in mobilizing support from 
diasporas as it used framework of cultural traditions, which were actively practiced by the diasporas, 
to mobilize for political support as well as not relying on regional tribal relations as other Kurdish 
political parties such as the KDP and the PUK. From 1980’s the PKK was able to raise around 50 
million dollars annually from activities in the diasporas.245 The refugees who arrived during the 
1980’s and second-generation Kurdish migrants tend to be more politically active, than the generation 
who arrived as guest workers during the 1960’s and 1970’s as a result of diasporic activities in 
1980’s.246 The political conflict in homeland was effectively constructed by the politicized diaspora 
in Europe from 1980’s onward. 
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Kurdish unity was seen as a grave threat by the Iraqi regime, as the militias had capacity to cause 
inflict even greater casualties with support from Iran.247 Kurds became not only traitors, but also 
enemies of the state. Saddam Hussein started repressive and more violent operations against the 
Kurdish population which could be described as an attempt for ethnic cleansing. The regime would 
raze entire villages to create free-fire zones to eliminate entire population from those territories, 
soldiers would round up youth and children in villages for detention and resorted into systematic use 
of torture.248 The army also used chemical weapons the first time against civilian population in April 
1987 when it retaliated PUK’s advancement by using gas in Balisan valley.249 As Iranian and Kurdish 
forces continued to claim positions In Iraq, the army initiated operation Anfal where the army used 
chemical weapons and heavy bombardment to assault Kurdish held areas. In March 15th 1988 Iraqi 
army assaulted town of Halabja with chemical weapons, killing 5000 civilians in the process.250 Iraqi 
forces continued their attacks against villages where civilians would be rounded up and males would 
be detained and executed.251 At the end of the Iran-Iraq war over 4000 villages had been razed and 
1,5 million people resettled by force. 252  Chemical attacks became focal point of international 
community as pictures and stories were spread to international media over the deed that in it's brutality 
seemed to fall under crimes against humanity. 
4.4. Globalization of the Kurdish conflict 
Halabja bombings of 1988 was a tragedy which brought major international attention to the conflict 
in Kurdistan and also had a profound effect on the Kurdish diaspora organizations. After the incident 
a major conference was held with participation from KR, KCC, Kurdish institute of Brussels as well 
as French Human rights groups.253 Kurdish groups were able to find each other as well as international 
partners to address specific issues related to the situation in Kurdistan.254 This started the process of 
institutionalization the Kurdish diasporic organizations in that they had to develop global human 
rights based perspective as well as adapt to operational models of international community. The Gulf 
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War of 1990 internationalized the Kurdish conflict in a new way as the status of Kurds in Iraq became 
one of the central issues regarding Iraq that the international community had a vested interest in. Part 
of US policy in Iraq was strengthening opposition to Saddam Husseins regime by including the 
Kurdish political elite in Iraq and abroad as official representatives to international forums. Kurdish 
parties formed lobbies in Washington to further their interests in Iraq.255 This was an instance where 
the host state cooperated with the diaspora to pursue foreign policy interests and thus, opened up new 
opportunities for the diaspora to actively influence events in their homeland.  
 
Iraqi Kurdistan held self-declared elections in 1992 with KDP and PUK being the only parties which 
surpassed the 7 % threshold needed to gain seats in the parliament.256 With both economic siege by 
Baghdad on KRG and the international community’s embargo on Iraq, the alliance between Barzanis 
KDP and Talabani's PUK broke down to disputes over resources, land and power.257 
 
International community’s involvement in Iraq intensified in humanitarian efforts that where initiated 
by the UN. The United States was the main sponsor of these efforts and in addition to funding aid, it 
organized confidence building measures for the elites of Northern Iraq and facilitated meetings 
between Massoud Barzanis KDP and Jelal Talabani's PUK to strengthen opposition against Saddam 
Hussein in Northern Iraq.258 After several failed negotiations hosted by France and the US, the parties 
were able to reach agreement in 1998.259 Oil for food program and development of economic and 
social infrastructure in KRG normalized the relations between the two parties.260  
 
Despite Baghdads stance that the elections were illegal, the Kurdish Regional Government that was 
formed assured that it was not against International Community’s consensus on need for Iraq’s 
territorial sovereignty. At this time KDP and PUK representatives abroad formed relations with states, 
working as embassies for the KRG.261 With access to international forums and most importantly to 
Washington, the KRG leadership cooperated with maintenance of no-fly-zone in northern Iraq and 
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lobbied for toppling of Saddam Hussein and establishing federal Iraq.262 Influx of refugees into 
Turkey pushed the country to prevent further violence in Iraqi Kurdistan and furthered an initiative 
in the UN to establish ”safe zones” in Iraq to enable secure return for the refugees,263 while Turkey 
established working relations with both the PUK and the KDP.264 The PUK and the KDP affiliated 
diasporas utilized new political opportunity structures to influence their host states policy in Iraq in 
furthering Kurdish autonomy but also mediating tensions among the political elite in their homeland. 
 
Turkey’s involvement in multilateral resolution to the refugee crisis and conflict on northern Iraq and 
international community’s new interest in the Kurdish conflict and human rights issues in the region 
pushed the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal to start a dialogue process with the PKK in 1992. He 
offered his open hand to them and promised amnesty for guerillas and recognition of PKK as a 
legitimate political party in Turkey. 265  Although Özal recognized 266  the underlying issues of 
socioeconomic problems and constant warfare and violence which plagued the people in the east, 
commitment to a peaceful solution was denied by the Turkish nationalist constituency that insisted 
on suppressing the PKK by military means.267 A new wave of violence between the state and the 
PKK militias ensued and led to destruction Sirnak, a town of twenty five thousand people in the same 
year.268 The overall death toll of the offensive in 1992 reached over two thousand.269   
 
After resurgence of violence in Turkey between the state and the PKK, Kurdish members of the 
Turkish social democratic party were expelled in 1994 who then formed Kurdish parliament in Exile 
in Brussels as a forum for Kurds to discuss contemporary issues. The institution did however become 
a vehicle for the PKK, which used it to establish information centers to different locations in 
Europe.270 It established Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD) in Brussels 
the same year, which became the head of pro-PKK diaspora organizations in Europe, North America, 
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Australia and Asia.271 The conflict in the country of origin was being transported in discursive level 
through diaspora organizations in Europe.  
 
With the conflict continuing in Turkey and Iraq, increasing number of Kurds sought asylum in Europe. 
272 The quota refugees were selected from persons who were under the protection of UNHCR and 
who did not have the possibility to continue their flight on their own to Europe.273 This program also 
moved Kurds to Finland for the first time in a considerable number.274  
 
The diaspora organizations that had adopted the PKK ideology continued to extend their discourse 
among the diasporas in Europe and used every opportunity to bring the Turkish-Kurdish conflict to 
the public with mobilization of protests, organizing road blocks and making hunger strikes.275 The 
diasporas organized demonstrations during Newroz and when new developments took place in 
Turkey. Protests and hunger strikes were held in places with high visibility and The PKK affiliated 
activists also made coordinated attacks against Turkish owned businesses and Turkish associations 
in Germany, Switzerland and France, one of them ending to death of a Turkish business owner in 
November of 1993.276  
 
PKK resorted into terror tactics, targeting tourist sites in Turkey’s south and also operations abroad 
in Europe. On 24.6.1993 Turkish Embassy in Berne was attacked after which Germany and the rest 
of the Western countries declared PKK as a terrorist organization.277 Even though Abdullah Öcalan 
himself denounced the violence committed by his supporters in a 1996 Med-Tv interview,278 the more 
moderate stance towards violence was not adopted by the more radical elements of the party in Turkey 
or the diaspora members in Europe. As with the violence committed by the Kurdish diaspora members 
in the 1980’s, the resurgence of violence in the early 1990’s by the PKK-affiliated diaspora should 
be understood as a result of both of events in homeland and host land: resurgence of political violence 
in Turkey with the breakdown of negotiations between the state and the PKK, the PKK’s use of 
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specific tactics as well as continuing marginalization of Kurds in Europe and radicalization of the 
discourse in the diaspora organizations all influenced the diaspora to mobilize in a violent way at this 
time. 
 
With international denouncement of the PKK, the organizations’ space of maneuver depleted and 
Öcalan was captured in a joint operation of Turkish National Intelligence Operation, Mossad and CIA 
on 15th of February 1999 in Kenya. His capture led to massive protests by Kurds in Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq, Syria and Armenia as well as by the diaspora communities across Europe. Over 8000 people 
were arrested in Turkey with two protesters killed in suppression of the protests and in Berlin 4 
protesters were killed by the Israeli security of the Israeli embassy, which the protesters were 
attempting to occupy.279  Capturing of the PKK leader did not reduce the tensions between the conflict 
parties in the homeland of the diaspora, but on the contrary increased antagonism.  
4.5. Efforts for peace 
During a fragmented political period in Turkey from late 1990’s to 2002 when the country 
experienced a financial crisis in 2001 and there was 3 separate governments from 1999 to 2002, the 
government and the PKK signed a peace treaty in 1999. After November 2002 general elections a 
new political party, Justice and Development party (AKP), came into power and placed solution to 
the Kurdish question as one of it's main goals. By eliminating ban on Kurdish language publications, 
decreasing detention times and abolishing state security courts and engaging in a reconciliation talks 
with the PKK leadership, the state and the PKK sought for a peaceful solution to the conflict280 despite 
attacks and kidnappings committed by the PKK through the 2000’s.  
 
 As Turkey’s relations with the EU states was improved with the membership process, it used the 
opportunity to cramp down PKK’s network in Europe. The PKK supporters positioned themselves as 
antagonistic against Turkish and foreign governments as well as more moderate Kurdish political 
constituencies, taking a critical stance to US invasion. Inclusion of the Iraqi Kurds but excluding the 
PKK and the Turkish Kurds from the western agenda along with categorization contributed to 
radicalization of it's supporters in Europe, who raised funds for military activity both against Turkey 
and against Iraqi Kurdish parties.281 Tensions rose after the war as the KRG declared the PKK as 
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terrorist organization in 2004 as part of concessions to the Turkish government.282  
 
The Iraq war of 2003 made KRG representatives in Washington heavily involved with administration 
of the war with the US government. Though the KDP and the PUK elite acted pragmatically by 
adjusting their nationalist claims to federalism in Iraq, the diasporas took more separatist agenda.283 
The diaspora organizations in Europe lobbied both the KRG elite and Western governments when 
they saw that Kurdish interests were threatened, as the US administration was planning to give the 
Turkish troops access to northern Iraq.284 The PKK-affiliated diaspora joined the anti-war movement 
with leftist parties in Europe, utilizing the institutional framework acquired during the 1990’s to 
cooperate with organizations such as Greenpeace as well as political parties in mobilizing rallies and 
gathering support for their cause.285 When the war ceased members of the Kurdish diaspora who 
originated from Iraq cooperated with the KRG, international NGO’s and foreign governments in re-
building of Iraqi Kurdistan.286 The reaction of diaspora members should be understood again in the 
changing political opportunity structures and context in home and host land: Turkey’s new political 
leaderships took a more inclusive stance towards the Kurds which reduced the tensions and at the 
same time the PKK leaderships ideology and strategy became more moderate, which reduced 
legitimacy of violence as a political tool. The PKK-affiliated diaspora moved closer to civil society 
actors in Europe and adopted strategies of mobilization that gathered them legitimacy to utilize 
political opportunities available from cooperating with the civil society, although their discourse 
remained detached from the PKK leaderships more moderate stance. 
 
The PKK and the Kurdish diaspora from Turkey had a clear interest in Turkey’s EU candidacy at the 
period as it was directly related to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. It gave them internationally legitimate 
forum where they could meet politicians and NGO’s. In 2011 Turkey and France made an agreement 
against terrorism, which was used to capture PKK leaders originating in Turkey.287 Resurgence of 
violence from 2010 between the PKK and Turkey reflected in the diaspora community in France 
where PKK affiliated activists clashed with the French police after some individuals were detained 
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with allegations of belonging to a terrorist organization.288  
 
Official peace accords between the Turkish state and the PKK commenced from 2013, as the AKP 
government and the PKK leadership attempted to end the conflict despite ongoing acts of violence.289 
Abdullah Öcalan made a press release in March 2013 where he called his party members to restrain 
from violence and declared that ”democratic struggle” had commenced.290  
 
In January 2013 one of the founding members of the PKK and an important figure in the 
administration of civil affairs in Europe Sakine Cansiz was found murdered along with two other 
Kurdish activists in Kurdish information center in Paris.291 The slaughter was committed at the same 
time as the Solution process between the PKK leadership and Turkish state was being initiated. Cansiz 
was known to be a hard-line figure within the PKK who was initially against Abdullah Öcalans pro-
peace stance.292 Although the sole suspect by the French anti-terror unit was Ömer Guney, a member 
of the Turkish intellegence service MIT,293 the murder was however condemned by both the PKK 
leadership and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 294  Estimated 15,000 Kurds 
protested in Paris where some of the demonstrators clashed with the police, while security of the 
Turkish embassy was strengthened by Parisian police.295 The protests continued in February as new 
demonstrations were held in Strasbourgh against European Court of Human Rights’ silence over 
killing of 155 civilians in Cizre by Turkish troops earlier that month.296 Like Germany during 1990’s, 
France was seen as a partial host country in the conflict by PKK supporting diaspora. It was also 
going through a recession which reflected also on public prejudice297 towards immigrant population 
which was a contributing factor to radicalization of the diaspora. The events in France demonstrated 
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that the gap between the PKK-leadership and the events in France during the time when peace accords 
were taking place had a more significant impact on the diaspora’s way of mobilizing than the events 
in the homeland did.  
 
4.6. Resurgence of violence in Kurdistan and political claims 
Kurds joined the protests in Syria that took place in 2011.298 As Kurdish militias took control of 
Kobane, Amuda and Afrin in 2012 with little resistance from the Syrian government forces,299 
Kurdish political parties formed Kurdish Supreme Committee to govern these territories. 300  As 
fighting intensified between the Syrian government forces and the rebel militias in 2012, the Kurdish 
Democratic Unionist party (PYD), the Syrian branch of the PKK, took control of the major cities with 
Kurdish majority and established a de-facto autonomous region.301 The region is governed according 
to ideological principles of ”democratic confederalism” which is based on Abdullah Öcalans 
ideological writings since 1990’s. The region has representative offices in Moscow, Stockholm, 
Berlin Paris, Prague, Oslo and Washington.302 
 
The Syrian civil war and escalation of the conflict to in the region gave a new opening for the Kurdish 
political movements to establish an independent Kurdish state. In May 2014 the KRG started to export 
oil to Turkey despite opposition from Baghdad.303 The expansion of militia group ISIL in Syria and 
Iraq from 2014 pushed the Syrian and Iraqi army from their positions in the Kurdish areas, which 
gave space for the Kurdish troops to fill the power vacuum304 and on first of July in 2014 Mahmoud 
Barzani, the head of the KDP and president of the KRG announced that an independence referendum 
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would be held ”within months”,305 although it was later postponed due to continuing fight against 
ISIL.306 The KRG leadership acted to mobilize the diaspora in Europe and elsewhere307 as well as 
America.30858 Kurdish associations including KOMKAR signed a petition for European governments 
to support the independence referendum.309 The referendum was an example of the homeland elite 
mobilizing the diaspora to pursue their interest in their homeland.  
 
ISIL militias attack into PYD held town of Kobane resulted into fighting between Kurdish and 
Islamist groups in south eastern Turkey and sparked major protests with anti-Turkey sentiment across 
Turkey and Europe.310 Hundreds of Kurdish protesters occupied the Dutch parliament demanding 
more action from European countries in battling ISIL group.311 In Brussels several protesters got into 
the European Parliament.312 The Dutch hastened their participation in the war efforts against ISIL by 
sending six fighter jets to bomb ISIL targets without applying for UN mandate313 and in Brussels 
Martich Schulch promised to bring the Kurds’ concerns to negotiations with EU and NATO 
leaders.314  
 
There was still suspicion by the PKK-affiliated Kurdish diaspora towards France as Fidan Ulubayar, 
representative of the Kurdish Associations of France, expressed his frustration with France which he 
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said was helping Kurds in Iraq but not in Syria,315 indicating competition between the local diaspora 
groups. In Hamburg group of Kurdish demonstrators and Salafist Muslims brawled forcing the 
German police to dispersing the demonstration with water cannons.316 The protests of 2014 were 
sparked by developments in the country of origin as Kurdish diaspora in Europe rallied to gain support 
from their host countries against an enemy that was considered common which threatened European 
countries with terrorist attacks. Sympathy towards the Kurds was not limited to the state level, as 
many westerners have joined the ranks of Kurdish militias as volunteers.317 The diaspora across 
Europe mobilized transnationally to the escalation of the conflict and opening of opportunity to 
establish a Kurdish state as Syrian Iraqi states collapsed. The diaspora autonomised the conflict in a 
way to not only gain legitimacy, but also direct support from host states towards the war efforts as 
the conflict was framed against a common enemy. In France and Germany with more radical diaspora 
group and more closed system the conflict manifested a as violence between the PKK-affiliated and 
the Turkish diaspora groups as well as antagonism towards the host states.318  
 
The AKP suffered a defeat in the elections in june 2015, losing votes both to Kurdish Halk Demokrat 
Partisi (HDP) and far nationalist Milliyet Halk Partisi (MHP), which hampered the ruling party’s 
incentive to continue the peace process.319 In July 2015 an ISIL affiliate terrorist cell made a suicide 
bomb attack killed 34 people in the Town of Suruc in North East where a major rally for the HDP 
was taking place.320 Following the attack a group affiliated with the PKK killed two Turkish police 
offices in the town of Cylanpinar following the Suruc attack.321 The Turkish military initiated a 
military campaign against the PKK on 24.7.2015 by attacking targets in Syria and Iraq as well as 
making a crackdown on PKK affiliate targets in Turkey and engaging in urban warfare in towns and 
cities of Eastern Turkey, ending the peace accords that started in 2013.322 In August 2016 Turkish 
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troops entered Syria to border town of Jarablus to push back ISIL militas but also to contain 
movements of the Kurdish PYD militias in the region.323  
 
As ISIL held Mosul was being besieged by Kurdish and Iraqi troops in early 2017, Masoud Barzani, 
the president of the KRG and head of KDP announced that the referendum was to be held within the 
same year.324 The referendum did not however receive widespread legitimacy across all Kurdish 
political constituencies as it was seen by the PUK other parties as a tool of Barzanis and KDP as a 
tool to legitimize their ruling status of the KRG.325 The rift between the KDP and the PKK which 
have competing political projects in the region,326 was manifested as lack of support by the PKK or 
the YPG towards the referendum. The incidence shows how the Kurdish national identity was being 
not only contested by the nation states in the region, but also by different Kurdish political 
constituencies that had competing political claims based on Kurdish national identity.  
 
In January 2018 Turkey launched an military operation in Afrin district of North-Western Syria 
controlled by PYD which Turkish regime regards as a branch of the PKK. The Turkish president 
declared that the goal of the operation was to ”cleanse the area step-by-step from terrorist influence”, 
referring to PYD’s presence in the district and also stated that the operation would be followed by an 
operation in Manbij further east from Afrin.327 On 18th of March Turkish backed Syrian militia 
captured Afrin and looted shops and apartments in the process.328 UN estimated that the operation 
has displaced thousands of people.329 Turkish regime has indicated that it has plans to resettle Syrian 
refugees that it hosts to Northern Syria, which the president has claimed to aim ”ensuring stability 
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and safety in the area”.330 
 
The Turkish offensive to Afrin was followed by mobilization of protests among the Kurdish diasporas 
around Europe, as thousands took part in protests in major cities in Germany, in Paris where a group 
of protestors organized a sit-in front of the Eylsee Palace, in London and Brighton, in Amsterdams 
Schipol airport, in major Swiss cities and in Austria’s Vienna and Graz.331 The protesters carried flags 
and banners with symbols related to the PKK and YPG as well as images of Abdullah Öcalan, which 
are banned in Germany. In Cologne where one of the biggest protests in Europe, the German police 
detained individuals distributing flags and gave fines for several others for carrying pictures of Öcalan 
in the protests.332 Some of the protests resulted into violence, as in Dusseldorf several people were 
injured in clashes between Kurdish protesters and Turkish counter-demonstrators333 and two Turkish 
mosques were attacked by protestors in Lauffen and Berlin.334 In the same way as the Siege of Kobane, 
the Turkish offensive to Afrin was an event in the homeland that was met with mobilization of the 
diaspora organizations and sparked violence in Germany where tensions between the Turkish and 
Kurdish communities are high and where the political opportunity structures prevent the mobilization 
in being channeled through official channels.335  
 
4.7. Kurds in Finland 
As a country that modernized it's economy relatively late to Western European and other Nordic 
states, Finland remained immigrant sending, rather than receiving country until the 1980’s 336 and it 
did not make guest worker agreements with Southern European countries like Germany, France, 
Britain, Holland or Sweden.  The first Kurdish immigrants to Finland arrived as students in the 1970’s 
and more arrived in the 1980’s as asylum seekers, some of them traveling through The Soviet Union 
to apply for an asylum status in Finland.337 Most however, arrived as refugees from Iraq, Iran and 
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Turkey during the 1990’s as part of UNHCR resettlement program.338  
 
Civil rights of foreigners in Finland were furthered from 1980’s onward as they were provided with 
freedom of association, which made it possible for immigrants to establish their own associations.339 
Although during 1990’s Finnish resettlement policy was egalitarian where the expectation was quick 
integration with publicly funded language courses and other activities that the immigration officials 
thought were useful in this process. 340  In 1997 the Finnish government approved a resolution 
regarding tolerance and racism, which gave minorities right to choose their own methods of 
maintaining their cultural identity. 341  The multicultural policy was solidified with act on the 
integration of immigrants and reception of asylum seekers, where integration was defined as a two-
dimensional process involving  ”the personal development of immigrants, aimed at participation in 
work life and the functioning of society while preserving their language and culture”.342 It indicated 
individual integration plan, financial support for individuals participating in integrative activities such 
as participation to language courses and local integration programs as the main instruments in 
implementation of the policy.343  
 
Similar to multicultural policy of Sweden,344 teaching native language and adopting it's culture part 
of the multiculturalism and integration policy, which is seen as helping immigrants in adapting to a 
multicultural society and as such, associations that are set up to preserve migrants’ "native culture" 
are eligible to apply public funding from the Ministry of Culture and education.345 This means that 
migrant associations have a major role in the implementation of multicultural and integration policies 
in Finland, and as such associations that are interested to get funding from the state have to cooperate 
with municipalities and other state institutions. Finnish education system provides language education 
for minorities and Kurdish has been one of the most studied foreign language in Finland already from 
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2007 in primary schools.346 Even though Finland has a reputation of having a successful multicultural 
policy, 347  there are gabs between policy and implementation in terms of resources allocated to 
multicultural activities and institutional coherence.348 In comparison to other systems though, Finland 
can be considered as open as there is a low threshold for the diaspora organizations to cooperate with 
the civil society or reach political leadership.  
 
According to official statistics from 2017, there are 13 327 people with Kurdish as their mother tongue 
living in Finland. The community is concentrated in the capital area as well as in Turku and Jyväskylä, 
although Kurdish speakers can be found across the country. 349  There is a discrepancy between 
genders as 8 084 of these people are men and 5 243 are women. Age-wise, the Kurdish speaking 
population in Finland is relatively young, as around 67 % are under the age of 35. The number of 
Kurdish speakers in Finland have been increasing sharply from mere 179 in 1990 to 3115 in 2000 
and reaching over 10 000 in 2013. It should be noted that there are also people who identify 
themselves culturally or otherwise as Kurds, although their native language is not Kurdish.350  
 
As many Kurds don’t have a strong affiliation with their state of origin, and because having a Finnish 
citizenship has a lot of practical advantages, many of the Kurds in Finland apply for Finnish 
citizenship and in 2010 number of Kurdish speaking Finnish citizens was 3 337,351 which was over a 
third of the whole Kurdish speaking population in the country. Majority of first generation Kurds in 
Finland originate from Iraq, although there are also Kurds from Turkey, Iran and Syria.352 The first 
generation of Kurds are heterogeneous in terms of educational background and class, as the 
availability of public education varies greatly in the countries of origin.353 Differences in the level of 
education and language skills among the first generation correlates with gender, as women have 
proportionally lower level of education and language skills than men.354 Wahlbecks’ study made in 
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1990’s suggests that Kurds in Finland have suffered from systematic prejudice and racism 
discrimination at the time,355 but there is a lack of data from recent years if the situation has changed.  
 
During the 1990’s politically oriented Kurds organized according to their country of origin or political 
affiliations.356 the Kurdish Association in Finland (Suomen kurdien yhdistys) was firstly established 
in 1992 and was reformed in 2014 as the Kurdish federation (Kurdiliitto) an umbrella for Kurdish 
associations in Finland. Kurdish Information Centre was established in 1993,357 which worked as a 
gathering place for the PKK-supporting Kurds and works today with the name of Finlands Kurds 
Culture Center (Suomen kurdien kulttuurikeskus). Other associations that were established in Finland 
during the initial decade were Ekgerin, a nationwide cultural organization, The Kurdish National 
Peace and Solidarity Committee, an intellectual association with international reach and the Kurdish-
Finnish solidarity committee, a Finnish organization.358  
 
Transnational ties to Sweden and elsewhere were important during the 1990’s in organizing and 
establishing associations in Finland. 359  Kurdistan Information center that was later replaced by 
Information Centre of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan was established already in 1995.360 
The Kurds have traditionally organized according to their countries of origin, due to differences in 
the dialect of Kurdish language, but also according to different political affiliations.361 Activities of 
these associations has ranged from organizing cultural and social activities to political activism.362 
According to data from 2011 Kurdish parties working actively in Finland were KOMALAH and 
KDPI.363 The PKK support has been presented with party symbols and pictures of Abdullah Öcalan364 
during demonstrations and the party possessed an office space in Helsinki by late 1990’s.365 In 2009 
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the PKK links in Finland raised the attention of the authorities as two persons were arrested as 
suspects of supporting the organization, which is labeled as a terrorist organization by the EU.366 As 
Finland does not register data according to peoples ethnicity, according to Finnish Patent and 
registration office, there are around 50 registered associations which include the name ”Kurd”, that 
are located all over the country with an emphasis in the capital area, as well as in Turku and 
Jyväskylä.367 The high level of organization around Kurdish identity entails that there is an active 
effort by the diaspora in Finland to maintain Kurdish identity, which means that the active members 
work to construct the diasporic identity in Finland. 
 
The Kurdish diaspora in Finland has organized demonstrations related to their homeland conflicts 
already from early 1990’s368. In 1999 when Abdullah Öcalan was captured, there was a demonstration 
attended by around 500 people in Helsinki,369 and in recent years the diaspora has mobilized in 
response to intensifying conflict in Kurdish areas as a result of the major conflicts in Syria and Iraq. 
As a response to the siege of Kobane during the autumn of 2014, the Kurds in Finland mobilized 
demonstrations in Helsinki,370 Tampere,371 Turku372 and Jyväskylä373. A group of activists in Turku 
demonstrated with a hunger strike.374 The demonstrators demanded efforts from the international 
community to support people in Kobane in their struggle against Isis.  
 
In June 2015 Turkey broke the peace process that it had with the PKK and started attacking PKK 
targets in South-Eastern Turkey. There was a demonstration in Helsinki in October where a group of 
protesters threw eggs at the Turkish Embassy and threw rocks at the police.375 Another major protest 
was during the major “Peli poikki”-demonstration in Helsinki against racism, which was a support 
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demonstration for the autonomy of the Rojava region in northern Syria.376 Numerous protests were 
held in response to Turkish offensive to Afrin from January 2018 in Helsinki, Tampere and Turku.377 
From Finnish political parties, the Leftist Union (Vasemmistoliitto) has condemned Turkey’s assault 
to Afrin.378 The Kurdish diaspora members in Finland seem to react to events in Kurdistan in a similar 
way as the diaspora in other parts of Europe indicating transnational linkages. Support towards the 
PKK’s and YPG’s ideology can be seen during d as party emblems and pictures of Öcalan are 
displayed and political songs affiliated with the movement are played.  
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5. Analysis 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapters’ aim is to shed light on mobilization process of the Kurdish diaspora in Finland by 
examining what kind of discourses of mobilization there are among the core diaspora members and 
how are boundaries of membership constructed by them. The analysis is based on theoretical 
framework on conflict diffusion and diasporas’ relation to conflicts. It follows on Feron’s concept of 
conflict autonomisation379 in that it looks at how the diasporas’ core members construct the conflict 
in the Finnish context and on Fiona Adamsons mechanism of diaspora mobilization380 by looking at 
specifically how boundaries are drawn as part of the mobilization process. The chapter also follows 
on discussion over outbidding between different diaspora groups that has been presented by Baser381 
and Adamson382 and elaborates how the Finnish context affects these processes. 
 
Diasporas are not homogeneous entities but consist of different groups, communities and individuals 
which have their own backgrounds, ideologies and interests.383 This means that diasporas do not 
always mobilize in a unified way, but different groups unite under different circumstances and can 
also act in different ways than other groups. As diasporas and conflicts are in the process of constant 
reconfiguration that are subject to changes by homeland and host-land contexts, the boundaries that 
are constructed by diaspora groups also change according to changing environment.384 In this 
study ”Kurdish Diaspora” as a singular refers to those who identify themselves according to the 
definition that is used in this study of diaspora which is an identity that is defined by dispersion of 
space, orientation to a perceived homeland of the diaspora and boundary maintenance to other 
identity groups. At the same time each diaspora member is also an individual subject who have 
diverse identities and can take multiple positions in accordingly. As such, the respondents should not 
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be understood solely as representatives of one group, but as subjects belonging to different entities 
who can take multiple positions.385 
 
The analysis section of the thesis will exhibit the findings by moving from discussion of the notion 
of belonging and construction of pan-Kurdish discourse through social categorization and boundary 
maintenance by the core members.  This is followed by chapter on how diaspora groups are formed 
through political categorization as well as how diaspora activities are politicized because of the social 
boundaries that are constructed. I will then move on to discuss the mobilization process where I will 
first cover how the respondents expressed their view about their political opportunity structures after 
which I will discuss on role of technology in the mobilization process. This is followed by a section 
on conflict diffusion regarding how the conflict is autonomised by the Kurdish diaspora in Finland. 
The last section then looks into how these social boundaries are manifested in ways these diaspora 
groups mobilize and how their position in relation to Finnish society affects their strategies. The 
structure of the findings chapter is to move firstly from broader society wide in-group and out-group 
position towards looking more specifically on how social boundaries are constructed by the Kurdish 
diaspora groups which helps to understand how and why these groups are formed. The aim of the 
analysis is to examine what kind of categories of membership are constructed by the diaspora and 
how the Kurdish diaspora members position themselves in the Finnish society with these categories. 
Lastly the findings are brought to a broader contextual and theoretical framework. 
5.2. Belonging and mobilization 
All of the respondents in this study represented interest in Kurdistan, as well as having a desire to 
have an impact in the development of the region. As Toivanen found in her study, participating in 
political activities is part of identity construction and maintenance for the second generation Kurdish 
diaspora members.386 Indeed, all of the respondents to this study also demonstrated a sense of 
belonging to Kurdistan or specific region in Kurdistan as territorial entity, which corresponds to 
Toivanen’s and Kivistö’s previous finding.387 A in-group category that I found among all of the 
respondents was strong attachment to Kurdistan as a region which was attached with attributes of 
interest in the occurring events in the region and relating to people in the region.388 Placing this to 
 
385 Toivanen, Kivistö, 2014, 71. 
386 Toivanen, 2016, 102. 
387 Toivanen, Kivisto, 2014, 71. 
388 Baker, 1997, 142. 
59 
 
the theoretical framework of this study, this observation suggests that the respondents expressed a 
territorial belonging to Kurdistan.  
 
In this extract when asked about what Kurds in Finland think about what is happening in Kurdistan, 
he expresses his sense of belonging to the region: 
Interviewer: ”Um.. What do Kurds in Finland think of what is happening in Kurdistan?” 
Respondent: ”Our hearts are always there and we always hope that everything will go well there and 
we try to politically encourage the Finnish government to help Kurds and by this we want to work in 
legitimate ways” 
The respondent expresses his sense of belonging to Kurdistan and links it to political lobbying 
activities. Another respondent talked about her connection to people in Afrin, where major fighting 
between Turkish army and YPG troops was taking place: 
 
”And of course, probably people in Afrin don’t know me at all, but I am here and I am sending pictures 
for them (about the demonstration)… Of course it brings some kind of good feeling, like even though 
we are not in a middle of war, I still want them to know that we are in Europe, on the streets, knowing 
about their suffering.” 
 
Here the respondents wanted to emphasize that even though she did necessarily have direct social 
relations with any individuals in Afrin, she still felt a sense of solidarity with them, indicating a 
connection between political activism and belonging with Kurds in Afrin. In both of these extracts 
Kurdish belonging is entangled with a degree of political orientation towards the perceived homeland, 
which was prevalent among all respondents to this study. Belonging is thus political in nature, which 
would suggest that political mobilization has an effect on sense of belonging among the Kurdish 
diaspora in Finland.389 The interviews confirm what has been stated in previous research about the 
Kurdish diasporas’ belonging that the diaspora have an interest and a level of responsiveness to events 
happening in Kurdistan,390 and forms of Politico-cultural essentialism, meaning politicized forms of 
expressing culture and identity on a transnational sphere. 391  The respondents used historical 
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narratives and references to reflect their belonging to Kurdish people, which indicates a sense of 
shared history and a degree of Kurdish nationalist identity. Belonging to a pan-Kurdish identity will 
be elaborated on the second section of this chapter. With their activism in Finland the respondents 
positioned themselves as active participants in Finnish society. In her study which is based on 
interview and ethnographic data from 2011, Mari Toivanen argued that young Kurds in Finland who 
were part of her study expressed their identity through political participation,392 meaning that for them 
political participation with demonstrations and advocacy was part of the reference categories to which 
they demonstrated their membership to the diaspora. Among the respondents for this study this other 
in-group category of Finnish citizenship is associated with organizing associations and activities as 
well as cooperating with other civil society actors and participating in the political system in Finland. 
As such, this finding compliments Toivanen’s finding that second-generation politically active Kurds 
expressed belonging to Finnish citizenship in addition to Kurdishness.393  
 
Events in Kurdistan were described as having a direct impact on Kurdish diaspora members by some 
of the respondents because of families or relatives living in the area where events are taking place. In 
the following extract the respondent discusses the impact of the conflict on Kurds in Finland: 
 
Respondent: ”What happens in Kurdistan shows and certainly affects very heavily on the Kurdish 
community in Finland. It can even affect as badly as resulting into mental health problems for 
different people, especially today when information is available so easily, as when a person opens 
their phone, laptop, television or any channel, then suddenly there are those struggles, war and death 
and bomb attacks, terrorism, everything in the Kurdish area or the Middle-East at large comes… It 
certainly affects and has an negative impact on the community” 
 
In this extract another respondent discusses difficulties of Kurdish families or individuals living in 
more remote areas in Finland: 
Respondent: “If a family or a relative live in Oulu for example and their family or someone they know 
has died in Syria for example it is very hard. We should support these families because for example 
if there is a demonstration in Helsinki and many would like to attend, they can’t. And it’s not possible 
to arrange a demonstration in each town and this affects the family’s life as many families are 
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depressed since they can’t participate.  
 
The topic of mental health issues was raised by 3 of the 9 respondents. It was associated with stress 
of worrying about family members who are living in unstable parts of Kurdistan and inability to take 
part in demonstrations or other activities organized by the diaspora. This nexus of belonging, mental 
health and conflicts is not well understood in academic research. Sense of belonging has been 
categorized as a mental health concept that ”is defined as the sense of experience of personal 
involvement in a system or environment so that person feel themselves as integral part of system or 
environment”.394 Cajax and Gill who studied connection between belonging and mental health among 
rural Indian diaspora in Canada, argued that sense of belonging to their community and opportunities 
to practice and express one’s culture were associated with wellbeing of the Punjabi community living 
in rural Canada. 395  In the interviews In my study the respondents associated participation in 
demonstrations as an activity that eases stress and other negative effects of the events in Kurdistan 
have on the diaspora members. Family relations but also sense of belonging make the events in 
Kurdistan meaningful and personal for the Kurdish diaspora members. This would suggest that the 
conflict in Kurdistan has a direct psychological effect on Kurdish diaspora members in Finland, and 
also contribute into mobilization of the diaspora.   
 
5.3. Pan-Kurdish discourse 
All of the respondents expressed membership to a ”pan-Kurdish” identity. Construction of pan-
Kurdish identity is typical of transnational diasporas, as it reflects the Kurdish diasporas transnational 
character,396 and also their status as an ethnic minority in the host country. Even though Kurds in 
Finland do maintain identities that are bound to certain location in Kurdistan and establish 
associations around certain dialects of Kurdish they also interact with Kurds from different parts of 
Kurdistan and form associations which maintain pan-Kurdish identity in Finland. Similar to 
Sweden,397 the Finnish environment offers opportunities for the Kurdish migrants to interact with 
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Kurds with varying backgrounds. Belonging to this pan-Kurdish cultural group was determined by 
interaction to Finnish society, which is a feature in societies with dominant identity group and 
minority groups.398  
 
The determinant categorization devices that distinguished the Kurdish minority from the Finnish 
majority399 were language and culture. Thus, in a similar way as in Sweden, 400  the Finnish 
multicultural system also allocates minority groups to different ethnicized groups that form pan-
ethnic identities. Cultural features were described in contrast to the dominant ”Finnish” culture to 
distinguish from the majority group. This compliments Toivanen’s finding where belonging to 
Kurdish minority was determined by interaction with the Finnish majority,401 as the respondents 
positioned themselves as representatives of the Kurdish minority during the interviews to the Finnish 
majority, which was represented by the interviewer.402  
 
The interview situation where I as a representative of the Finnish majority interviewed a member of 
the Kurdish minority resulted the respondents to position themselves as the representative of the 
minority group. When answering question on what kind of people are Kurds in Finland, the 
respondents presented characteristics of Kurdish culture in reflection to the majority Finnish culture. 
In this extract the respondent describes Kurdish cultural characteristics: 
Interviewer: ”Okay then so my second question, this is quite a broad as well, so what kind of people 
are Kurds in Finland?” 
Respondent: ”Well Kurds in general, if compared to Finns, are pretty social, very hospitable, umm… 
then they are a bit temperamental mmm… they like a lot of like… they like a lot of social situations 
and visit each other a lot, although less than before. Umm… Kurds are the kind of people who at the 
first hand seem like they are hotheads, but when they soften a bit, they have a lot of potential. This is 
how I would see it, if I would generalize all of the Kurds. 
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”Social” and ”communal” were used by seven of the respondents to describe Kurds in Finland. They 
can thus be regarded as attributes that are attached to the in-group category of “Kudishness” or pan-
Kurdish cultural identity.403 Other three chose another topic instead, which did not describe Kurds’ 
cultural characteristics. As these features emerged in the interviews as comparisons to the Finnish 
culture, they are social categories that indicate standards of behavior.404 This would suggest that 
communalism is a way of maintaining the minority cultural status in the Finnish system. The 
respondents mentioned keeping frequent contact with the local Kurdish community with visits as well 
as through associations and activities as part of communalism, which function to maintain cultural 
traits.405 Associations set up by the active members of the diaspora accommodate and maintain sense 
of belonging406 and are the main channel where framing of the diasporic identity, articulation of social 
boundaries and transnational brokerage takes place.407  
 
In the following extract, the respondent discusses about his identity and what it means to be a Kurd 
for him, when asked what do Kurds in Finland think about the events in Kurdistan: 
Respondent: ”Of course, every Kurd wants to maintain their identity and it's the truth that if you hide 
or erase your identity, you don’t have anything else (referring to belonging) towards other states and 
I think it’s always good to think about the perspective that every Kurd sees themselves as Kurd, now 
and ever because all that we have sought on this Earth- we are such a large population without it's 
own nation, has been that small right, which is to live in peace in our own country...” 
 
Another respondent expressed her thoughts about Kurdish identity and citizenship: 
Respondent:”I think, or in my opinion, all the Kurds, they should have a right to their own language, 
even though we live in different countries like Syria, Turkey, but all should understand, that we are 
firstly Kurds and then citizens otherwise.” 
 
Here the respondent expresses his pan-Kurdish identity with a sense of shared history and belonging 
to homeland that consists of whole Kurdistan. The Pan-Kurdish identity is connected to Kurds’ 
consciousness as a stateless diaspora in a world of nation states, which was seen as the unifying factor 
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for all the Kurds. The shared sense of history that was expressed throughout the interviews consisted 
of oppression of Kurds by states where Kurdistan is located, forced dispersion and struggle for 
Kurdish state. As the historical narratives were built around political struggle, they serve the function 
of constructing a common political identity around Kurdishness.408 Social boundary is drawn between 
Kurdish minority and the Finnish majority culture. There is a fluidity in determining one’s 
membership as can be seen from the extract above and as has been argued by Toivanen in that Finnish 
citizenship and Kurdishness are not mutually exclusive, as the respondent also expresses belonging 
to Finnish citizenship.409 In the following extract the respondent discusses her sense identity as Kurd 
and as a Finn, reflecting fluidity of identity with referencing to localized belonging as a person who 
grew up in Vaasa, while also referring to what Toivanen called ethnicization of Finnishness410: 
 
Respondent: “But I fell myself as being from Vaasa, because even though one can say that they are 
Finn, they cannot say that they are from Vaasa”... ...”but this Finnishness is difficult because I differ 
in terms of appearance and culture from the Finns...” 
 
The categorization between Kurdish minority and Finnish majority reflects on how Kurdishness as 
ethno-cultural entity is distinguished from cultural Finnishness that was seen by the respondents as 
exclusive category in cultural terms, similarly to what Toivanen had argued about ethnisized notion 
of Finnishness. 411  Reflecting on Barth’s theoretical framework on societies with majority and 
minority culture, the social boundaries reflect those that are determined by the majority group in the 
society.412 This means that interaction between the Finnish group category and the Kurdish group 
category places the Kurdish group as a minority within the Finnish society.  
 
In this extract the respondent discusses Kurdish identity in Finland drawing comparison to the 
Finnish interviewer: 
Respondent:”...but every Kurd see themselves as Kurd and if not, then I question that because, I 
mean, you as a Finn can’t say after fifteen years that ”okay, now I’m not a Finn anymore”, it’s 
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unnatural, that… and it shows in practical activities in a concrete way when going to support Afrin, 
Kobane, Northern-Iraq and so on.” 
 
The respondent uses the interviewer to express his group membership being determined by interaction 
between the cultural groups. Activism in Kurdish affairs was associated with the category of 
Kurdishness by all of the respondents, which reflects on the importance of political activities for the 
Kurdish diaspora. Mobilization is seen as means of maintaining Kurdish identity. In this pan-Kurdish 
discourse he frames all of the recent major events in Kurdistan, Turkish offensive in Afrin, siege of 
Kobane in 2014 and the independence referendum of September 2017 as part of the common Kurdish 
struggle. The minority status of Kurdish group in the Finnish society pushes the diaspora to strategic 
essentialism,413 which is a way of emphasizing the minority status along the lines of the “Kurdish” 
category to obtain recognition.414 In the interviews it happened as framing the events in Kurdistan as 
unifying occasions, as can be seen in the extract above. 
 
Experience of being a refugee and a member of a cultural minority were in-group position that were 
used to determine relation to the society. Refugee experience was an association to the in-group 
category of Kurdishness that was used to reflect status in Finnish society, as hardships related to 
forced migration and adaptation to a new environment were factors that differentiated the respondents 
from the Finnish majority.  
 
In this extract the respondent takes the interviewer as a reference point as he represents the Finnish 
majority in the interview situation: 
Respondent: ”Being a refugee has an impact immediately when we are in Finland, thoughts of the 
parents are in Kurdistan and children try to learn and support their parents, but it's out of question 
since they are in a different world, business world here in Finland and they are so confused, like if 
you would live in an environment like that for a month you would… lose your sanity. it's really- it’s 
a fact that it's so messed up and here Kurds are trying survive from one day to another to get the 
basic ends meet, because it is close to impossible to train one’s own children, support own children 
so that they would become big decision makers and important people like doctors on so on, 
engineers and so on, because that livelihood is what it is, the childrens’ status is what it is, all affect 
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it.” 
 
The refugee background as a categorization tool is linked to Kurdish identity and the historical 
narratives of Kurdish identity. In the extract above the respondent engages in data generating 
occasion,415 referring directly to the interviewer in locating himself within the Finnish society as a 
son from a refugee family with a different status than “native” Finns have. In addition to being related 
to the historical narrative of dispersion, the refugee status categorization also functions to place the 
group within Finland as foreigners and as socioeconomically disadvantaged group.  
 
To conclude, construction of pan-Kurdish diasporic identity is accommodated by the active diaspora 
members with frequent cultural and political associations and is shaped by interaction with the 
Finnish society. Categorizing is determined by the majority-minority relationship within Finnish 
society and has ethno-cultural tendency. The minority status of the Kurdish group affects the diaspora 
members to essentializing the Kurdish identity to obtain recognition which can be seen in 
emphasizing relevance and impact of events in different parts of Kurdistan in being a pan-Kurdish 
issue. By emphasizing activity as Kurds in Finnish society the respondents also expressed their 
belonging to Finnish citizenship, which highlights their multipositionality. The next section will move 
on to discuss how politicized nature of diasporic Kurdish identity and it's effects on social boundary 
construction and diaspora group formation. 
5.4. Ideologies and social boundaries 
The respondents referred to belonging to a stateless entity as the source of politicization of the Kurdish 
affairs in Finland. The stateless status means that Kurds have unrecognized status as an entity in the 
international system, but it is also a social question in that they have subordinated cultural, political 
and economic status within the host society.416 This lack of recognition and citizenship is at the heart 
of the Kurdish conflict, in that the core conflict has been unwillingness by the nation states that divide 
Kurdistan to recognize a sovereign Kurdish state, or historically even the existence of Kurdish identity. 
The Kurdish identity is thus politicized through claims for recognition that is contested by the nation 
states in the Middle-East.417 Different diaspora groups can have differing relation and interests to the 
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conflict depending on their political affiliations.418 
 
The political nature of the Kurdish identity was reflected by respondents during the interviews: 
Respondent: ”And all those people who have even small interest towards the Kurdish issue. And the 
Kurdish issue itself is somehow politicized.” 
Interviewer: ”In what way?” 
Respondent: ”In a way, it’s because Kurdistan is not ready, it’s incomplete and because it is that 
way,  it's easy to attack against as we have seen. And like if you look that during 90’s the news 
broadcasted that Turkey attacked to Kurdistan, today we see that Turkey is attacking Kurdistan. So 
it is still incomplete, people suffer, so it is a necessity for people to reach it, to build a state through 
politics, to create a nation with symbols, and it shows here as well.” 
 
Among the respondents to this study seven out of the nine respondents described the Kurdish 
community in Finland as ”divided” in terms of political orientation and politicization of associations. 
The divisions were drawn according to ideological affiliations as well as according to linguistic and 
geographic basis of communities. Based on the analysis on membership categorization devices two 
diaspora groups could be distinguished: Apoists who followed the PKK-founders Abdullah Öcalans 
ideology and Kurdish nationalists who expressed a pan-Kurdish nationalistic discourse. Political 
ideologies thus represented main out-group categories,419 making it a social categorization device.420 
The events in Kurdistan and political activities in Finland were framed by most of the respondents as 
pan-Kurdish occasions which makes them spaces for contest for different groups.421  
 
A respondent from the Apoist group defined his community through ideology: 
Interviewer: ”So the first question is: Describe in your own words how is the Kurdish community in 
Finland?” 
Respondent: ”Kurdish community is… An ideological community, thats basic pillars are 
communalism and at the same time analysis of relations between people, development and activity 
within the society, to always be in a role to have an impact in that society wherever we are based in 
the world.” 
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In the following extract the respondent is responding to a question to describe the Kurdish community 
in Finland: 
Respondent: ”Well for them the society is… associated more with political activities, party politics, 
and well… it’s affected by friends and environment a bit. And now that we were in the demonstration, 
there were no Iraqi Kurds there, although there has been from everywhere, mostly maybe PKK-
supporters or supporters of the Rojava regime, and also ordinary people, but mostly the community 
is dispersed, if political parties have connections, then ordinary people also have, if not, then they 
don’t.” 
 
Political ideology and localized identity (”Iraqi Kurd”) are discussed as a common feature by the 
respondent when he is describing the group of people who did not take part in the demonstration.422 
Ideology and localized identity were categorization device among five of the nine interviews. 
Localized identities are associated with support for a political constituency that has large support in 
that area of Kurdistan, so Kurds from north and west Kurdistan (Turkey and Syria) were associated 
with the PKK and YPG while Kurds from east and south Kurdistan (Iraq and Iran) were associated 
with KDP and PUK. In the second extract the respondent mentions the importance of social networks 
in determining political orientation among Kurds. This confirms that Wahlbecks observation from 
1999 on mobilization of Kurds in Finland follows social and political constituencies is still relevant.423 
Multipositionality of the respondents can be seen in their expressions of belonging to a pan-Kurdish 
identity as well as territorialized sub-groups of Kurdishness. Strong communalism and tight social 
network and it's localized nature was mentioned by another respondent: 
 
Respondent: ”But… Yeah they are also from the same areas as well, like where I come from, I’m a 
Turkish Kurd and majority of Turkish Kurds in Finland are from same town as I am. Like… a lot of 
them. It’s like a really large amount and they know each other and they have a connection, a family 
or… at least some friend of a friend who have some kind of relation to each other.” 
 
The Apoist respondents associated other ideological groups with ”right wing”, ”Barzani-
affiliated”, ”nationalistic”, ”conservative” and ”passive” which were contrast to the groups in-group 
position defined by Apoist ideology. These are the main attributes that the Apoist respondents 
 
422 Baker, 1997, 132. 
423 Wahlbeck, 1999, 163. 
69 
 
attached to the out-group category of ideological diaspora groups.424 The Apoist respondents saw the 
PKK and YPG as the most legitimate representatives and made categorizations according to the 
ideology. The ideology is left-wing in that it is rooted in radical Marxism of the 1970’s425 critique of 
international nation state-system,426 the categories reflect members’ political aspirations in Kurdistan, 
which indicates sectarian outbidding that is part of mobilization of the Kurdish diaspora in Finland.  
 
The members of the nationalist group associated those affiliated with Kurdish party politics as ”not 
well integrated” and ”sectarian”. This out-group category was defined by the type of political activity 
practiced by supporters of Kurdish parties in Finland, some of which were seen as illegitimate in the 
Finnish context. The Kurdish nationalist group used strategic essentialism in mobilizing and 
representing the Kurdish diaspora through nationalist perspective despite political differences among 
the Kurds.427 The political parties were associated with Kurdish sectarianism, which is in contrast to 
pan-Kurdish diasporic identity, as they contest representation Kurdish community within the 
majority-minority system.  
 
Because of politicized nature of Kurdish diasporic identity, different associations not necessarily 
focusing solely political activities, were associated with different diaspora groups that represented 
different Kurdish political constituencies. Four of the respondents stated that there exists a degree of 
social segregation between diaspora groups because of political reasons, but also due to language 
barriers.  
 
In the following extract the respondent talks about political nature of Kurdish associations in 
Finland: 
Respondent: ”Well for example when representatives of Kurdish political parties establish their 
own party association, they include the party’s interests. They are not open to everyone. And the 
biggest challenge that we have in Finland is that, like since I came to Finland as seven to eight 
years old and seen this for my whole life, I’ve seen that Kurds don’t have nonaligned associations. 
It’s always somehow political. If not officially, then unofficially and it has been very frustrating to 
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see. I have tried to effect the situation, but a million times I have been labelled as political.” 
 
In this extract the respondent who identifies himself as a Turkish Kurd, making a distinction by using 
first and third person: 
Interviewer: ”Then I would like to ask about community or association activities, so what kind of 
associations do Kurds have in Finland?” 
Respondent: ”Well quite many. In my understanding there are at least 70 official registered 
associations...” ”...but most of them- those associations are either established by Iranian or Iraqi 
Kurds. We only- or Turkish Kurds- only have two associations.” 
 
The respondent described social stigma associated with being involved with Kurds from other 
political constituencies: 
Respondent:”...so if for example I go and do something with him, as an individual, I would be blamed 
as a traitor ^laughs^ it’s not easy to work here you know, it's not easy. Straight away I am stigmatized 
^laughs^.  
Interviewer: ”So is there among the communities some kind of barrier to co-operate?” 
Respondent: ”Yes there are. For example those who we have good relations are towards supporters 
of leftist political parties, even though they would be Iranian Kurd, Syrian Kurd or Iraqi Kurd.” 
 
Although Kurdish political parties are associated with certain parts of Kurdistan, social division is 
framed by the respondent as a political and ideological issue. The categorization device of geographic 
and cultural background of other Kurds is thus entangled with political connotations. Social stigma 
that was associated with cooperation with members of other groups indicates process of outbidding 
and group competition which will be discussed in the following section. 
 
5.5. Outbidding 
Stateless status of Kurds and lack of unifying political constituency in Kurdistan leads to competing 
political visions, which all have a claim on the Kurdish identity. This leads to politicization of the 
Kurdish diaspora groups and a process of outbidding, where communal values and group identity are 
reinforced428 and comparison system where juxtapositions between the diaspora groups is constructed 
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that results into the two groups having an antagonistic position to each other.429 The outbidding 
among the Kurdish diaspora in Finland takes place mainly between the two diaspora groups (“Apoists” 
and “nationalists”) centered around two associations: the Kurdish Federation (Kurdiliitto), which 
attempts to work as an umbrella for Kurdish associations in Finland that is not politically affiliated, 
and the Kurdish Cultural Centre of Finland (Suomen kurdien kulttuurikeskus) which leans 
ideologically towards the PKK.  
 
In this extract a Kurd from northern Kurdistan shares his thoughts about the Kurdish Federation: 
Respondent: ”When over 70 associations in this country are officially registered and 23 or 24 are 
involved in this (Kurdish Federation), then how can we call it a union? I think it is not ethical to go 
and establish a union and register it when most are not involved. And precisely because of alleged 
political impartiality many don’t want to get involved. There’s no Turkish Kurdish associations 
involved, or there are two, but no Turkish Kurds.  
Interviewer: ”So there is this political question-” 
Respondent :”Yes it is and all of these unions are supported by Barzani in Europe. And that, at least 
here in Finland for example Turkish Kurdish associations are not going to be involved.  
 
The respondent juxtaposes Iraqi Kurds and supporters of Barzani as he continues to discuss about the 
Kurdish political parties in Finland, expressing dichotomous aspects of the ideologies and creating a 
antagonistic comparative pairing, indicating a competitive setting between the diaspora groups.430 
Salience of Kurdish identity makes political activities as sites of outbidding for the diaspora groups.431 
Demonstrations against Turkish operations in Afrin during the time of this study were organized by 
the the Apoist group, which express their ideological orientation with symbols and emblems related 
to the movement such as flags that carry pictures of Abdullah Öcalan, the YPG party symbols, by 
playing PKK-related anthems and songs during demonstrations and chanting slogans of the 
movement. This is a way of claiming the political space and presenting the political movement as the 
representative of the Kurdish movement for the Finnish public.432 It is also an example how the core 
members of the diaspora groups use strategic essentialism to gain recognition for their group as the 
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representative of the Kurdish minority within the Finnish society.433 As in Sweden,434 the Finnish 
system allocates minority groups to ethnic categories, for example with policies that support teaching 
of Kurdish language and maintenance of Kurdish culture. The outbidding setting is indicated by how 
the respondents frame their own group as containing Kurds from different locations, while associating 
the other with certain territorialized sub-group of Kurds. Lobbying requires being more involved 
within the Finnish political system and there the diaspora members who are involved also represent 
the minority community in Finland for the decision makers, which makes it a site of outbidding.  
 
Here the respondent expresses raising awareness among the Finnish public and decision makers as 
one of the goals for their mobilization: 
 
Respondent: ”For us our most important task is to bring awareness. So information is our main 
priority and what we mean by that is that we announce what is happening in the area and who are 
participating. Then we leave the decision for citizens to make the conclusions and also to offer 
solutions to influence the issue, everyone on their own part, but of course so that we can wake the 
state from it's sleep and that we have since the beginning of this war, so since Turkey attacked, from 
the early days been in contact with politicians, the parliament, the parties on this matter.” 
Another respondent discussed about Kurdish diasporas political activities in Finland overall:  
Respondent: ”The demonstrations for example in squares and organizing seminars are a way of 
showing that the will among the Kurds is strong and that we want to influence. Although having an 
impact is very challenging, especially through dialogue, but here it is possible for example that we 
have people in the political field who can bring the Kurdish issues to the political decision makers, 
like I myself met with ___ this autumn and we talked about the Kurdish question and there is this 
dialogue where we are having this conversation that he knows what it is about and at the same time 
they ask from the people involved, that it’s not from like a book that is telling this, but this is face-to-
face real thing how we Kurds operate in Europe.” 
 
The conflict in Kurdistan was framed as a pan-Kurdish issue, which unites Kurds from all 
constituencies, highlighting the pan-Kurdish identity. Outbidding takes place in political activities 
between the diaspora groups that attempt to claim the events with their activities. In the following 
extract the respondent who can be described as an active member, answers a question about Kurdish 
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political parties’ activities in Finland, indicating the pan-Kurdish discourse constructed by the core 
diaspora: 
Respondent: ”We don’t have any bigger differences, but we are together in different groups, but 
during protests we go all together when something happens in some area in Kurdistan, everyone 
participates. And we think that if something difficult happens, we disagree, but we still maintain our 
will to further Kurdish rights, so we are not so divided, but all together.” 
 
Another site of outbidding is the Kurdish community itself in Finland, as diaspora groups attempt to 
gain support and mobilize them. Celebration of Newroz, or ”the Kurdish New Year” has been an 
important way of maintaining the Kurdish culture in Finland, but it has also become an important 
political event as different Kurdish political constituencies organize their own Newroz 
celebrations.435 As a major communal gathering, Newroz celebrations are occasions to maintain 
group identity, but it is also a stage for outbidding for the diaspora groups and a way of gathering 
support from the Kurdish community.  
 
In the following extract the respondent talks how the Kurdish Federation attempts to appeal to Kurds 
from Turkey: 
Interviewer: “So what about these Newroz-celebrations? Do all the Kurds, including Iraqi Kurds 
gather during them?” 
Respondent: “Yeah well… If Iraqi Kurd would organize it, one would see a lot of Iraqi Kurds, but if 
it would be organized by Turkish Kurds there would be people from elsewhere as well. The Kurdish 
Federation has attempted to organize Newroz in a way to bring the kind of artists who also Turkish 
Kurds know and like ^laughs^.” 
Interviewer: “So there is an attempt to bring all the communities together?” 
Respondent: ”There’s certainly an endeavor!” 
 
Apoist respondent discussed about reaching out to Kurdish communities in Finland, indicating efforts 
to gather support from whole Kurdish community in Finland: 
Interviewer: ”So you described these associations more as communities, so are all Kurds part of this 
community?” 
Respondent: ”Well if you mean by ”all” like each Kurd who is in this soil, then this is not the case. 
And of course our activities are also limited, we can’t reach all locations, all the people. Of course 
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we still aim to reach all the people and tell them about us...” 
 
I would argue that outbidding happens because of salience of Kurdish identity,436 which is a result of 
statelessness and politicization of Kurdish identity in the country of origin and also majority-minority 
group interaction that defines mobilization process in Finland as diaspora groups bid to represent 
Kurdish interests to the state and public. Contrary to Sweden where the Kurdish diaspora have formed 
a single body that consists of networks and organizations that work to lobby the Swedish decision 
makers and works as representative of the Kurdish communities, 437  the Kurdish community in 
Finland remains politically divided to competing groups. The Kurdish diasporic identity in Sweden 
has been constructed around language and culture with the support from the state from 1970’s 
onwards, which has decreased the impact of transnational movements that have constructed diasporas 
around political ideologies in Germany.438 Finland falls between these two cases in that while the 
Finnish policy does allocate diasporas to pan-ethnic entities with public education of Kurdish 
language and support for cultural practices, the Kurdish political parties have had a strong presence 
since the 1990’s. There has thus emerged competing diasporas that mobilize around Kurdishness in 
enthnicized form and around ideology and there exists no consensus between these groups on how 
the Kurdish community should be represented in Finnish society and what are it's common interests. 
  
5.6. Political opportunity structures 
As part of categorizing the data, a thematic category that emerged were political opportunity 
structures. It was undermined by what has been discussed above on fluid identity, where the 
respondents expressed inclusion to a Kurdish group while at the same time being part of the Finnish 
society as Finnish citizens. As actors, they react to events in Kurdistan with political activities and 
sought to further their interest as active.439 The discussion reflects on social boundaries that are drawn 
by the diaspora as it indicates how the diaspora interacts with the host society. All of the participants 
saw that the Finnish legislative environment, which allows freedom of assembly, freedom of speech 
and freedom of association, as enabling the Kurdish community to organize activities and allow 
political participation in different ways. The Finnish legal environment was associated with attributes 
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of ”openness”, ”freedom of expression”, ”freedom of assembly” and ”basic rights”. Norms of the 
Finnish society were identified as to be rooted in ”human rights”, as well as ”the rights of women”.  
 
 In a similar way as in Sweden,440 the boundaries that were constructed did not exclude belonging to 
Kurdishness and Finnish citizenship. Finnish citizenship allowed the respondents to be also active in 
diasporic activities such as organizing demonstrations or spreading information about the Kurdish 
issue in their homeland among the Finnish public. In these cases the in-group position of Kurdish and 
Finnish citizen complement each other, as the respondents’ use of strategic essentialism ties them to 
the Finnish multicultural system because they utilize their membership to Finnish citizenship and 
membership to of the Kurdish minority group in participating in Finnish society as actors. All of the 
participants expressed their willingness to organize political activities in accordance to laws and 
norms that they saw as related to Finland. As such, the Kurdish diaspora in Finland seems to have 
internalized perception of Finnish values in a similar way as the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden,441 
where internalization of such concepts were seen also as contributing into Kurdish culture in general. 
This also means that compliance within these norms and regulations were seen the legitimate way of 
mobilization.  
 
In regards to political and other activities and Finnish political environment, the response was more 
varied and mixed. On the other hand Finnish society was associated with ”inclusion” in that the 
political system was seen as allowing and even in some cases, encouraging participation in the 
society, ”supportive” in that Finland was seen as supporting Kurds to maintain their culture and 
language and ”diverse” in that the Finnish society is seen as open to different kinds of people and 
groups. At the same time respondents associated Finland with ”remoteness” as of meaning that 
Finland is geographically, which separates the Kurds in Finland from other communities in Europe. 
Finnish foreign relations with Turkey and Iran in particular ”restrained” in that the decision makers 
in Finland do not condemn what the respondents saw as violations against Kurdish rights in their 
homeland. A core member of the diaspora who has been involved with discussions about the Kurdish 
situation in the Middle-East with Finnish decision makers:  
 
Respondent:  ”... I have also been involved with politics and have contacts to many directions, I 
observe that sometimes it's even raised up that foreign policy is wanted to… er… it's something that 
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is not commented. That even though there is solidarity, people want peace, support human rights, 
stark statements, or even soft statements are not made and this has certainly been noted.” 
 
Finnish foreign policy was seen as hard-to reach through lobbying and was surrounded by restriction 
even by core diaspora members who were active inside Finnish politics. As such, it can be regarded 
as a limiting factor for political opportunity structures for the Kurdish diaspora in Finland. Turkey’s 
attack to Afrin and some associated it as being ”treacherous”, as those participants part of the Apoist 
diaspora group in Finland raised the issues of Finnish arms deals with Turkey442 which made Finnish 
state close to being a conflict party, especially among the Apoist respondents. Reflecting on 
Vetrovetc’s triadic relationship,443 it can be said Finnish states relations with Turkey and Iran affects 
how some of the diaspora members position themselves with regards to the Finnish state.  
 
Furthermore Turkey’s relation with the EU and Finland was seen by the same constituency as a factor 
that gave Turkey more space to influence in Finland and was also seen as having an effect on 
demonstrations in Turkey. After discussing about Finland and other countries opportunities to restrict 
Turkish influence in their countries, the respondent raises the fear of Turkish influence in Finland 
during protests: 
 
”...to say about Kurds in Finland… many have family there in the homeland and they want to visit 
them from time to time, but if they are active… and the state will anyway know who are active, who 
are doing things here, who are part of the movement… There are a lot of these Turkish agents who 
take pictures of us in demonstrations, on the streets and in some occasions and they are sent forward 
continuously so many have a fear that the Turkish state sees them somewhere. I wouldn’t say that it 
would be most of us, but it’s been growing lately. Even before there was a concern about Turkey 
threatening people that ”if you go to demonstrations, we will detain you”. Of course it brings sort 
of… panic. And at the same time Turkey is threatening Europe, and even Finland among other 
countries.” 
 
This fear of Turkish influence was coupled by concern over EU’s and Finland’s labeling of the PKK 
as a terrorist organization and it's implications on the politically active Kurds who support the 
ideology in Finland. This ”terrorist frame” has been discussed by Toivanen in her study on political 
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activism among Kurdish youth where she observed that the young Kurdish activists saw that EU’s 
and Finland’s policy was guided by their relations with Turkey, which led the Kurdish activists 
position themselves to polities between states.444 In the same way the respondents in my study saw 
that the relations between Finland and Turkey emerged as a factor which was perceived influencing 
diasporas’ capability to act in Finland, especially among the Apoist respondents. One of the Apoist 
respondents discussed about Finnish authorities restrictions during demonstrations: 
 
Respondent: ”… then refer to some treaty blah blah and the police officer should know that no treaty 
can go above the law, but the law has to first realize within the frame of the law… like today as well 
there’s the demonstration, we can’t use any PA-system so that none of the Embassies will be disrupted. 
Well too bad, why aren’t our rights taken to account, here our rights are being trampled!” 
 
When comparing Apoist and nationalist respondents’ position to the Finnish state, the Apoists 
expressed a more antagonistic attributes to the Finnish state as they emphasized it's relations with 
Turkey and role in the conflict, while the nationalist respondents took either a neutral stance or 
emphasized Finnish states limited capacity in international affairs. This difference in position 
reflected on standards of behavior,445 which will be discussed below on chapter about ways of 
mobilization. The respondent saw that relations between states guided the behavior of the Finnish 
authorities, which then restricted how the demonstrators could act during the demonstration. Other 
respondents referred to weakness of Finland in the international sphere as well as EU’s refugee deal 
with Turkey when they raised up Finland’s international status. As such international relations as well 
as Finnish states international interests with states involved in the Kurdish conflict can be considered 
as a factor that limits the diasporas political opportunities. I will now move on to discuss the role of 
media in the mobilization process. 
 
5.7. Media and mobilization 
Modern communication technology plays a major role in mobilization of the Kurdish diaspora in 
Finland. Following on what was happening in Kurdistan through media as well as other means such 
as through social networks was mentioned in most interviews as a way of maintaining Kurdish 
identity. One of the respondents described how his community follows the Kurdish media intensely:  
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”In Finland the Kurdish community is very informed and is constantly following (The media). If you 
would go to any home of members this school of thought (Referring to Apoists) you couldn’t see 
anything else from their televisions than what is happening there (in Afrin) and what are they 
communicating with us. Luckily we get instant information through technology, which is not distorted, 
someone’s opinion, but direct transmission by people who are living there who are telling about what 
is the situation, what they need and so on. And peoples hearts beat to the rhythm of events that are 
happening there.” 
 
The respondent links following the events directly to the sense of belonging as well as ideological 
affiliation. The respondents’ description of his community’s relation to media represents an example 
of Long-Distance identification, where the media connects people from different geographic areas 
and works as a platform for construction of shared identity through narratives that are perceived as 
common and shared experiences.446 Media and communications technology was also mentioned as a 
platform that brings together different parts of the Kurdish community in Finland as social media, 
particularly Facebook, provides a forum for Kurds from different parts of Finland to engage in 
discussions and for organizing events and other activities. In this way technology and social media 
plays a key role as a tool and platform for the Kurdish diaspora to construct and maintain their identity 
and also to mobilize support.  
 
In Keles’ study on media consumption and it's effect of Kurdish and Turkish diasporas, he found that 
the Internet plays a crucial role in diaspora members lives as it brings not only the relatives and family 
members of diaspora members closer to them, but it also connects them directly to organizations 
working there and acts as an important source of information.447 This means that technology brings 
the events and relations closer the individual and enables constant observation and interaction with 
the homeland. In the case of diasporas, this means that technology can connect the diaspora members 
to the conflict in the country of origin.  
 
Social media was mentioned by respondents being the main way of reaching out to the Kurdish 
community in Finland: 
Respondent: ”Well today social media is the regular channel, especially Facebook, so there for 
example the Kurdish Federation has it's own page which has around 6000 followers and we have a 
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group called ”Kurds of Finland” that is also under Kurdish Federation’s administration, there are 
around 3000 members, both Kurds and Finns and there they discuss about topics, if there is an event, 
we comment, speak, share, spread, it spreads quite quickly from there...” 
 
Another respondent discussed about convenience of modern communications technology: 
Interviewer: ”So you mentioned technology in your communications, is it the primary tool for 
reaching out to people and getting them involved in the activities?” 
Respondent: ”Well partly, but as I said this technology gets us information for example about the 
situation in Afrin, we don’t have any other methods, that’s fine, but we have other tools as well which 
can be anything. A fast way is to gather together and if we want to transmit a message then we will 
use technology to send it and distances here are not that we can go to each door so yeah technology 
has a central role, but it’s not the only way.” 
 
Social media is an important space for outbidding between different diaspora groups, which is central 
for mobilizing the Kurdish diaspora, as it is a space where diaspora groups are able to reach and 
interact with Kurds from different parts of Finland while also having a connection to transnational 
Kurdish communities present in the cyberspace as well as in Kurdistan. The first extract where the 
respondent claims that certain pages and groups are considered to be ”under the Kurdish Federation” 
would suggest that Kurdish diaspora groups in Finland create cyber communities,448 but studying 
how outbidding takes place there would require further research.  
5.8. Conflict diffusion 
All of the respondents discussed how the events and the conflict in Kurdistan has direct effects to the 
Kurdish community in Finland. Conflict diffusion can be said to be taking place within the Kurdish 
diaspora in Finland in discursive level, but as there are frequent contacts between Turks and Kurds, 
the conflict is not transported in social level as social segregation.449 This could be partly as a result 
of non-existent opposition group, which would construct inter-group antagonism.450 One of the 
respondents discussed how Finland as a conflict party:  
”…Of course now with the situation regarding Afrin, Finland as a state is also a conflict party on the 
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side of Turkey, according to us because they stay silent over this issue and as a big statement for 
Turkey, they sell arms and know that these arms are used in Northern-Syria, and then of course they 
bear the responsibility as a state in the war in Afrin.” 
 
At the same time however, the respondent emphasized his belonging to Finnish citizenship when he 
was discussing about the Finnish states relations with states that are involved in the Kurdish conflict:  
Respondent: ”Think about if there would be a better deal to be made, what else could we do? If we 
don’t hold on to human values, human lives are neither going to be appreciated and also the refugee 
policies here in Finland tell something about how these things go hand-in-hand, individual cases but 
these are all connected together and form this environment where human rights have no place in and 
which I think personally as a Finnish citizen, that human rights should be the number one thing on 
which we should start to think on how to build relationships with other states.  
 
Even though the respondent showed resentment towards the Finnish foreign policy and actions of the 
Finnish state, he also emphasized that he is committed to what he perceived as norms within the 
Finnish society in attempting to affect the situation in Afrin. This indicates that the open opportunity 
structure as a system that is open to lobbying along with other forms of political activities channels 
this resentment to the civil society.451 
 
In this extract the respondent discusses about relations of the Kurdish community to other minority 
groups in Finland: 
Interviewer: ”With what kind of different organizations and institutions can Kurds cooperate in 
Finland?” 
Respondent: ”It depends of which Kurds you mean. For example PKK would under no circumstances 
cooperate with Turks, which I think is wrong since there are a lot of Turks who are also anti-
Erdogan.” … ”Our relations with other minorities are improving, except with the Arabs because of 
current political situation, although the Iraqi Kurds do like to suck up to the Arabs sometimes 
^laughs^.” 
 
In the following extract the respondent expressed a degree of antagonism towards the Turks in Finland: 
Respondent:”… well we don’t have any relations to Turks at all, at least personally I don’t have any 
relations with the Turks and… of course there are those leftist Turks, but even them are in a way that 
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they are leftist only for themselves. For example raising the topic of Kurds, they are nationalistic in 
a way… not bluntly, but by keeping a distance to Kurds and other ethnic groups, but especially Kurds 
and that’s why their leftism is questionable, like what kind of leftism is it that you only want rights, 
democracy, equality for yourself and not for others? In Finland there are a couple of persons who 
sometimes come to our events, but there aren’t many.” 
 
Two of the respondents, both of who represent the Apoist diaspora group, constructed a juxtaposition 
between the Kurds and the Finnish state indicating conflict diffusion on a discursive level.452 The 
respondents who expressed antagonism towards the Finnish state identified themselves belonging to 
the Apoist group, but contrary to diaspora groups associated with the same ideology in Germany,453 
the respondents did not express hostility towards integration to the Finnish society. At the same time, 
contrary to the case of Sweden,454 there is no active social segregation towards Turks in Finland. 
Thus, while the conflict discourse is constructed against the Finnish states’ policies, it is channeled 
through the civil society and political system because of opportunity structures available for the 
diaspora to cooperate with civil society and political actors. As the diaspora members have 
internalized their perception of how to operate in Finland, which includes non-violence and respecting 
human rights, they act accordingly to gain legitimacy from the public. Integration to the Finnish 
system makes public legitimacy important for the diaspora groups. In addition, Kurds in Finland do 
not have vulnerable status in the same way as the PKK-affiliated diaspora members have for example 
in Germany in terms of cultural and political rights,455 which also reduces hostility towards the host 
state.  
 
5.9. Ways of mobilization 
Contrary to what Wahlbeck has stated,456 the respondents stated helping arriving Kurdish refugees as 
a task for the diaspora in addition to their cultural and political activities. This might be because of 
increasing number of refugees, especially in 2015, arriving to Finland and public sectors inability to 
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properly handle the needs of the arrivals, 457  to which the civil society, including diaspora 
organizations reacted.  In the following extract the respondent who is a Kurdish migrant from Syria 
who has her own organization that supports asylum seekers and refugees in Finland describes 
connections between refugee status and mobilization in Finland: 
 
Respondent: ”So for example these families which arrived in 2015, half of their families are from 
Syria, half here in Finland, but even if the whole family would be here, other contacts would still be 
Syria like neighbors, relatives and everyone, so if something would happen there, it would be certain 
that it would have and impact on their lives here and because of that they want to take part in 
demonstrations because their family is there. And our organization that support immigrants, we might 
need to help them to know about these events where they can show their solidarity and support them.” 
 
The in-group position as a refugee is thus directly linked by the respondent to belonging, which is 
one of the factors for mobilization, as was established above. Respondents mentioned supporting 
arriving Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees to settle in Finland by forming a support network for 
them as part of their communal activities. The status as refugees in the way the Kurdish diaspora in 
Finland mobilize as a response to the refugee issue and can be argued to affect their position as 
advocates of refugee rights. The diaspora networks thus work as interest groups458  for Kurdish 
refugees in furthering refugee rights in the society as well as helping them in settling in the country. 
 
Ways of political mobilization that were mentioned in the interviews were remittances, 
demonstrations, advocacy, lobbying, participating in Finnish politics, helping with integration of 
Kurdish asylum seekers and refugees, assisting with meetings between homeland Kurdish notables 
and Finnish decision makers, and volunteering in Kurdistan. The Apoist and nationalist groups 
adopted different strategies of mobilization. Respondents from both of these groups positioned 
themselves within the Finnish society and transnational Kurdish movement, but in different ways. 
 
A respondent active in the Apoist diaspora group explains how decision about organizing 
demonstrations:  
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Respondent: ”We know a lot about each other. We might know someone from every country and… 
We do a lot of cooperation and plus if there is a decision about a demonstration, like ”now fourth 
day of March there’s a demonstration in everywhere” we react to that, because it is a shared decision.” 
 
In this extract the respondent describes how the Apoists organize synchronized communication to 
have demonstrations in different countries. As was established above, modern communications 
technology and social networks were used to spread information to mobilize communities in different 
localities. The final decisions on participation and how the demonstrations or other activities were to 
be made by the community in Finland. The process follows Adamsons’ mechanism of transnational 
mobilization,459 as the diaspora community in Finland is linked to the transnational movement and 
configure the communications according to the local context. The Apoist diaspora group in Finland 
engages in the Finnish civil society by cooperating with different actors including politicians and 
establish solidarity networks to help in advocacy work. The Apoist respondents, however, presented 
a reluctance in participating party politics. An extract of an interview with a respondent:  
 
Respondent: ”But now I’m not talking about other parties, because other- what we call ”classic party 
politics”, they are just that they probably have some kind of member cards and an organization, but 
we are a thing of our own, we don’t have that kind of way of doing things.” 
 
Another respondent talked about disinterest in the Finnish party politics among her community:  
Respondent: ”Well… There aren’t many Kurds who are in politics, which tells just about that some 
things don’t attract them to it. Erm… It’s not maybe an interesting place to be as an activist in a 
political party, because the subjects they discuss about and work on are kind of simple things. I mean 
for us! Of course for Finland they are probably big things, but at least for me…. I don’t want to be 
in these parties because it would be so boring to be there and talk about something like where to 
throw the trash.” 
 
The Apoist diaspora group thus positions itself within the Finnish society, but at the same time outside 
the conventional political participation. In the extracts, exclusion from Finnish party politics was 
described in terms of ideology and relevance by the respondents. The Finnish politics outside of issues 
concerning Kurds, is positioned outside to interests and goals of the diaspora community. Thus, in 
terms of membership boundary construction, the Apoist group constructs a boundary in it's 
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mobilization activities in that participating to the Finnish political system by becoming a member of 
a political party in Finland is not an activity that is considered as part of it’s membership, although at 
the same time it's members still emphasize the importance of cooperating with different Finnish civil 
society actors and one, as mentioned above, also expressed the importance of Finnish citizenship in 
public advocacy work. This is another indication of multipositionality that the Kurdish diaspora 
members have with regards to belonging to Finnish citizenship and to the diaspora. The group adopts 
a strategy of participating in the larger system as minority, but also attempt to create new ways of 
acting460 by working as part of a transnational movement. The forms of mobilization that the Apoist 
group members mentioned during the interviews in addition to demonstrations were lobbying Finnish 
politicians, arranging meetings between Finnish decision makers and visiting notables from the 
Rojava or PKK movement, such as Salih Muslim,461 advocacy, remittances and volunteering in 
Rojava.  
 
This boundary construction mechanism reflects on a distinction of what is considered ”Kurdish 
politics” and ”Finnish politics”, which emerged in 4 of the 9 interviews. This distinction concerns 
content of politics, but also mobilization. The nationalist respondents discussed how Kurdish political 
parties operated in a distinct way: 
 
Interviewer: ”Well umm… about these different political communities in Finland: What kind of 
differences are there in way of operation?” 
Respondent: ”They work in Finland as they would in their home country, so there are differences and 
they are considerable differences because they work in the same mentality here as they have worked 
there, which does not really fit into this society and environment. So yeah, there are differences. 
 
Another respondent discussed about his frustration over Kurdish party politics in Finland: 
Respondent:”...Well it means that we begin to focus on our history, you know, more in the Kurdish 
political world and that internal politics, which has it's finger here among us in Finland. I think its a 
bad thing, we don’t concentrate on the Finnish society, but use our capacity to that political- you 
know, lingering.” 
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Later the same respondent expressed his disapproval about a protest which took place in a public 
hearing of the Finnish parliament, where a group of protesters waved a flag of captured PKK-leader 
Abdullah Öcalan and YPG’s party symbol and shouted slogans of the movement462:  
Respondent: ”I mean in general: Why the do you to the Finnish parliament and shout with a Kurdish 
flag in your hand, it’s a holy place first of all! What can Orpo or Niinisalo or whatever, what can 
they do about it for you to go shouting there?” 
 
In this discourse, the respondents saw that Kurdish political parties were positioned as actors that are 
not legitimate part of the Finnish society and were considered as an import from Kurdistan to Finland. 
In this discourse on mobilization, instead of emphasizing transnational networks, the participants 
instead emphasized working through the Finnish society, including through political parties, to further 
their interests towards their homeland. The other ways of mobilization included lobbying of Finnish 
decision makers, demonstrations, assisting Kurdish refugees and advocacy. It has been established in 
prior research that political opportunity structures in the host state shape the diasporas way of 
mobilization, where states that more open to participation and access to political participation 
channels the activities into the political system.463  
 
The fact that the discourse that was presented by the respondents involved in political system in 
Finland would suggest that diaspora members who are involved within the political system of the 
host country prefer different strategies of mobilization compared to diaspora members more involved 
with transnational political movements contrary to Sheffers claim that stateless diasporas are prone 
to mobilize through channels from the host state.464 In the case of Kurdish diaspora in Finland, in 
both discourses on mobilization the activities that are implemented are similar, though strategies and 
preferences differ, in both discourses the aim is to work as part of the Finnish civil society. This could 
be explained with diasporas’ tendency to adopt models of operation when they cooperate with 
different actors. 465  Compared to Sweden where the Kurdish diaspora groups are more unified 
 
462 Kohelmainen, Tommi, Heima, Timo-Pekka, Harvinainen tilanne eduskunnassa, mielenilmaus keskeytti  
 kyselytunnin hetkeksi, Yle, 8.2.2018. 
463 Soysal, Yasemin, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe, The University of 
 Chigago Press, 1994.  
 Giugni and Passy, 2004, 104.  
464 Sheffer, 2013, 85-86. 
465 Emmanuelsson, 2005. 
86 
 
regarding representation of the Kurdish community for the state and the public,466 it is contested in 
Finland because of competition between diaspora groups.  
 
Respondents who were not members or affiliates of Kurdish political parties, but involved in Finnish 
parties expressed a specific discourse on characteristics of the Kurdish community in Finland: 
Respondent: ”I can say that when we speak about integration, none of the other immigrant groups 
from the Middle-East beats the Kurds! We are involved in the society, I can get a hold of your 
culture and what should be noted is that we are the people who establishes the most businesses in 
Finland.” 
Another respondent on answering a question on ”what kind of people are Kurds in Finland”: 
Respondent: ”But I think in general if you take a look at Kurds, they have managed quite well in this 
country, they have integrated quite well mostly. There are efforts to learn the language, to adapt to 
this society… Many have studied in Universities and higher education, in vocational school, built 
their lives here established a family”… ”And then entrepreneurship is very strong among the Kurds, 
especially in the restaurant business…” ”but there are businesses in other sectors as 
well…” ”...around 80% are under forty years old, so when we look a bit on statistics, we can see that 
around 5% are in retirement age, or even less.” 
 
The respondents chose to discuss about the Kurdish population in Finland in economic terms. The 
respondents’ rhetoric aims to argue that Kurds are economically contributing immigrant group, 
comparing them to other immigrants groups, as a well-integrated immigrant population in Finland. 
In the second extract the respondents uses statistics to demonstrate Kurds’  contribution and potential 
to Finnish economy and society. The extracts follow a public discourse on immigration policy, where 
successful immigration to Finnish society means employment as well as social inclusion of 
migrants.467 This could be as a result of internalizing the discourse as them involved in public affairs 
and it could also be directed by the interview setting, where a Finnish student interviews a member 
of the Kurdish community, who then takes the position as a public representatives of the Kurdish 
community as they sought to gain legitimacy from the majority Finnish public. These core members 
adopted the role of representative within the system with majority-minority interaction to participate 
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within this system.468 These respondents have different positions: as “official” representatives of the 
Kurdish community in Finland but also as members of Finnish political parties as well as being 
representatives of other public positions, which draws them to express what is considered as public 
interests and expectations from migrant communities in Finland. Public discourse on immigration 
was also used as a categorization device to compare Kurds to other migrant groups:  
 
Interviewer: ”How does Finland as an environment affect Kurds in Finland?” 
Respondent: ”Positively. In a good way, I mean in a really healthy way we need like a change of 
mentality and… to get rid of the role of religion in regards to women’s position and patriarchal 
society. So particularly for example how girls and boys are raised, even though it has not been as 
patriarchal, like for example in Arab or Somali communities as we have seen, Kurdish women are 
much more liberal...” 
 
Another respondent described Kurds as the best integrated migrant group from the Middle-East: 
Respondent: ”I can say that when we speak… about integration, none of the other immigrant groups 
from the Middle-East beats the Kurds! We are involved in the society, I can get a hold of your culture 
and what should be noted is that we are the people who establishes the most businesses in Finland.” 
 
When discussing about cooperation with other groups, organizations, or institutions there was also a 
difference between the diaspora groups as the Apoists referred to their ideology as a categorization 
device for determining their partners, while the respondents from the nationalistic group used 
minority status of the Kurds or refugee background as refugees as a categorization tool. 
 
In this extract the respondent takes the ideology as the categorization tool for cooperation: 
Interviewer: ”Yeah and so you mentioned these actors such as the parliament, MP’s and the state, so 
with what kind of actors can Kurds cooperate with?” 
Respondent: ”There’s no limit per se, but of course we have some principles on what we want to hold 
on to, we don’t want to compromise on human rights under any circumstances and… things that we 
do must not affect peoples lives… cost human lives and also we don’t want to commit acts against 
ecology...” ”...as I said, democratic confederalism, which is our paradigm for the future of the 
Middle-East, which has partly been practiced in Rojava, in Northern-Syria, has three main pillars 
which we take very seriously: The first is liberty of women, the second direct democracy and the third 
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ecology and these are taken into account in all of our decisions.” 
 
In this extract the respondent who belongs to the nationalistic group answers the question on 
cooperation with different actors: 
Respondent: ”In Finland maybe these different political parties are one channel through which it is 
possible to be involved and have an influence, when Kurds are active in different parties, it’s maybe 
possible to influence and then there are also different kinds of associations and organization that 
work both here in Finland and internationally, so through them. For example the Peace Union 
(Rauhanliitto), The Finnish church aid, the Red Cross, it depends on the context. We have contacts 
to ten different associations that work and have an impact here in Finland.” 
 
The difference in these position shows the difference in group discourse where the Apoists position 
themselves in the transnational sphere, which is reflected on their way of mobilization and 
categorization device for determining partners, while the nationalist group position themselves more 
as an actor within the Finnish society. The different positions leads to different mobilization strategies, 
as the Apoists work as part of a transnational movement that cooperates with local actors and the 
nationalistic group base themselves within the Finnish civil society. 
 
The respondents accommodate their minority status through the lens of Finnish public discourse on 
immigration while participating the political system. 469  These core members of the nationalist 
diaspora group represent themselves a public face for their community as they participate in the 
Finnish political system to further their interests both in Finland while also maintaining their 
commitment to Kurdistan.470 Adopting this position reflects on their strategy of mobilization, which 
is participating in the Finnish political system, as the respondents have adopted the public discourse 
in order to negotiate demands of their community.471 Multipositionality of the diaspora members is 
manifested in different ways according to their group membership and discourse: the members who 
are positioned closer to the Finnish political system also adopt position also as public representatives 
who frame their actions and position through public discourse on immigration and multiculturalism, 
while the members involved in transnational movement emphasize their action as furthering what 
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they associate as values of the Finnish state. The Finnish immigration policy supports cultural 
associations which further social and economic integration of immigrants to Finland,472 which creates 
incentives for the Kurdish diaspora to follow the public discourse on immigration. Extreme positions 
are thus avoided to utilize political opportunities available in the Finnish political system.  
 
5.9.1. Findings 
As has been established by Wahlbeck473 and Toivanen,474 the Kurdish diaspora in Finland has 
organized around an identity based in experience of belonging to Kurdistan, shared sense of history 
as well as shared experience as refugees. While it has been noted by both researchers that the diaspora 
in Finland has been politically active,475 the topic of diaspora mobilization has not received it's own 
research so far and is not well understood in the Finnish context. Furthermore, the previous research 
on the Kurdish diaspora in Finland has been made from the perspective of immigration studies 
where ”diaspora” as a term has been used in singular identity group and has not delved beyond the 
Pan-Kurdish discourse or looked into formation of diaspora groups, or conflict diffusion among the 
Kurdish diaspora in Finland.  
 
Adding on to Toivanen’s finding that political activism is a way of maintaining identity for the 
diaspora members,476 it is also a result of psychological need to fulfill the sense of belonging and it 
is also a result political mobilization that is taking place in the transnational sphere. Political 
mobilization of Kurds in diasporas should be understood in the historical context where the Kurdish 
identity is highly politicized in the region of origin and where the Kurds’ political agency is contested 
not only by nation states, but also by different Kurdish political constituencies. This background has 
an effect how expression of belonging takes place as politico-cultural transnationalism, as political 
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activism. Sense of belonging is heightened by media which brings events, ideologies and groups in 
Kurdistan closer to individual Kurds in Finland.  
 
The respondents expressed belonging to pan-Kurdish culture, as being a Kurd distinguished them 
from the Finnish majority in a system that is defined by majority-minority relationship. As has been 
established by Toivanen and Wahlbeck, the diaspora organizations work to maintain the Kurdish 
culture,477 but in addition this role means that the core members of the diaspora also construct 
Kurdishness in Finland and are the main agents of mobilization and as part of mobilization process, 
constructors of social boundaries. Through organizations such as associations or regular activities, 
these core members are able to build diasporic communities around their activities. The respondents 
have hybrid identities in that they see themselves as Kurds and also as Finnish citizens. There is no 
single diasporic identity among all Kurds, although the importance of culture, language, 
communalism and public activity was expressed by all the respondents, with Kurdishness being 
constructed around different aspects by different diaspora groups. In the interview data that I used 
two broad diaspora groups can be distinguished to be constructed around language and culture and 
political ideology. This does not mean however, that the whole Kurdish diaspora in Finland could be 
categorized to these two groups, but it represents the plurality and dynamics that take place among 
the Kurdish communities in Finland. 
 
The stateless status of Kurds, the Kurdish state projects’ contested nature emerges as strategic 
essentialism practiced by the Kurdish political constituencies as they attempt to claim the Kurdish 
identity for political purposes. This study suggests that core diaspora members who actively work to 
maintain the Kurdish identity also construct social boundaries based on ideology and geographic and 
cultural origin. The study thus confirms that Wahlbecks observation from 1999 that Kurds in Finland 
mobilize politically along social and political constituencies is still relevant.478 From the data that 
was used two main groups could be distinguished the Apoists who are connected to the transnational 
PKK movement and the Kurdish Federation which is based in Finland and has Kurdish nationalism 
as it's base ideology. These two groups engage in an outbidding process, where they both attempt to 
gain support from the Kurdish community in Finland while having a claim to represent the Kurdish 
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478 Wahlbeck, 1999, 163. 
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identity. While both utilize the open Finnish political opportunity structures and acted through the 
Finnish civil society, they adopt different position to the Finnish state and political system. The 
members of the nationalistic group see participation through Finnish political parties as the preferred 
way of acting. The Apoists emphasized their role in a transnational movement while the nationalists 
adopted strategy of working through “official” channels. This would suggest addition to Sheffers 
claim that stateless diasporas are prone to mobilize through channels from the host state,479 that 
stateless diaspora groups’ strategy is determined by it's affiliation with transnational movements and 
the host states interaction with these movements.  
 
In light of this thesis it can be argued that statelessness of a diaspora can be a contributing factor in 
formation of outbidding between diaspora groups, as the political project in the country of origin is 
contested by diaspora groups from the same identity group. Group position within the host country 
factors into mobilization strategy that is adopted by the groups. Groups that position themselves closer 
to the host state adopt discourse and strategies that help them to further their interests through the 
host country’s system and groups that position themselves further from the official state system work 
more in the transnational sphere. Adding to Fiona Adamsons concept of strategic framing and 
outbidding,480 I would argue that diasporas’ interaction with the host state and political opportunity 
structures available for the diaspora affect these processes in that in more open systems where the 
diaspora has incentives to position themselves closer to the host state may employ strategies to not 
only gather support from the diaspora itself, but also from the host state.   
 
479 Sheffer, 2013, 85-86. 
480 Adamson, 2013, 77-81. 
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6. Conclusion 
The research question for this thesis has been How does the Kurdish diaspora in Finland construct 
social boundaries in it's political mobilization. The study was conducted by using a set of nine 
interviews with core members of Kurdish diaspora in Finland which were gathered from 1.3 to 19.3. 
in Helsinki, Turku and Tampere. The data was collected using semi-structured interviews based on 
an ethno-methodological approach where the questions were broad in order to give the respondents 
as much space as possible to express themselves which would lead them to producing discourse units. 
The data was analyzed using a form of discourse analysis that looked to trace membership 
categorization devices to recognize what kind of social boundaries are being constructed by the 
respondents and coding in-group and out-group categories to recognize social functions of these 
mechanisms. The findings were then reflected on broader theoretical and empirical context.  
 
Limitations to the study were constituted by the number of interviews I was able to conduct, as larger 
number and larger geographic and demographic variety would have brought a more comprehensive 
and representative data of the Kurdish diaspora in Finland. Usage of Finnish as the interview language, 
which for the respondents was not their first language, meant that they had to express themselves with 
more limited vocabulary and were bounded to the epistemological constraints of the Finnish language. 
Another limit was exclusion of online data, which would constitute important knowledge about the 
subject as social media was identified as a space where the diaspora groups establish cyber-
communities and engage in discussion with different actors. There is thus gap in research on studying 
how the Kurdish diaspora groups act in this space and how does their outbidding, boundary 
construction and mobilization take place there. As the respondents were consisted only from core 
members of the diaspora, the perspective on how the social boundaries affect the passive members 
could not be distinguished.  
 
The Kurdish diaspora in Finland constructs a boundary between the Kurdish and the Finnish culture 
as their interaction was determined by the majority-minority interaction of the Finnish society. This 
compliments Mari Toivanen’s previous research on Kurdish youth in Finland, where she found that 
the Kurdish youths belonging to Kurdish culture was determined by their relationship with the 
categorization determined by the majority Finnish ethnicized form of Finnishness. The Kurdish 
diaspora members distinguished themselves culturally from the Finnish majority and expressed 
belonging to a pan-Kurdish culture. This pan-Kurdish discourse is facilitated, constructed and 
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maintained by diaspora associations and active core members by organizing political and cultural 
activities, which means that these actors have a major role in construction of social boundaries, as 
has been established by Fiona Adamsons mechanism on diaspora mobilization. The thesis adds to 
Adamsons concept of outbidding among diasporas that in addition to the diaspora, host states are also 
a stage for outbidding in that different diaspora groups attempt to represent the minority’s interests 
to the state and can employ different strategies to do so. 
 
Kurdish identity is politicized by claims of Kurdish political constituencies in Kurdistan region 
located between the border regions of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Historically Kurdish political 
movements have sought to establish a degree of autonomy from the nation states that were found 
there in the aftermath of the First World War, or have attempted to establish a sovereign nation state 
based on Kurdish nationalism. The Kurdish identity has thus been contested by nation states in the 
region, but it has also been a vessel for competing Kurdish political constituencies for their political 
claims. The politicized nature of Kurdish identity manifested also in the diaspora in Finland where 
the diaspora groups are formed according to political constituencies.  
 
Claims for representing the Kurdish people in the host land and in home land leads the groups to form 
membership categorization mechanism based on ideology and geographic background which 
politicizes activities of the diaspora. The groups that could be distinguished from the data were 
Apoists, who are connected to the transnational PKK-movement, and nationalists who relished a more 
pan-Kurdish ideology but were not linked to any particular Kurdish political constituency, though 
were associated with KDP and PUK by the Apoists. The study suggests that there is a degree of social 
segregation based on political differences between Kurdish diaspora groups in Finland, as the 
respondents expressed social stigma related to cooperating with the other group. These groups engage 
in outbidding where they attempt to gain support from the Kurdish population in Finland and gather 
political support from the host state. The core members who were interviewed for this study expressed 
belonging to Kurdishness as a culture based on language and culture, towards territorial identity based 
on family relations in homeland as well as diasporic identity based on cultural practices and activism 
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in Finland. They also expressed belonging to Finnish citizenship and with it positioned themselves as 
part of Finnish society. Thus, the respondents had variety of hybrid identities and multipositionalities.  
 
A poorly researched and understood subject that emerged from the data was connection between 
belonging, conflicts, mental health and diaspora which would seem to be one of the factors for 
mobilization. This would however require further research. Other possible points of departure for 
future research are adaptation of ideologies and construction of Kurdish nationalism by the Kurdish 
diaspora in Finland. Different diaspora groups’ transnational activity should also be further studied.  
 
Following Feron’s concept of conflict autonomisation, the members of diaspora in Finland that are 
part of the transnational PKK-affiliated movement does construct the conflict on a discursive level in 
Finland as some of the respondents expressed antagonism towards the Turkish state as well as the 
Finnish foreign policy. This resentment was channeled through the Finnish civil society and political 
system through public demonstrations and frequent contact with decision makers. There was however 
indication of frequent contacts with Turks in Finland, which would suggest that the conflict does not 
manifest itself in Finland as social segregation. This might be partly because of lack of organized 
groups that would oppose the Kurdish diaspora in Finland.  
 
The findings suggest that the Kurdish diaspora has internalized a perception of Finnish values that 
they want to follow and further by their activities. The legal and social environment in Finland was 
seen as open in a way that the diaspora can organize activities and allowed or even encouraged 
participating to the civil society and the political system. Limiting factors that were recognized from 
the data were the Finnish State’s cautious foreign policy which is hard to influence through civil 
society, the Finnish state’s relations with states involved in the conflict, particularly Turkey which 
was a source of antagonism and a source of insecurity for the politically active Kurds in Finland. 
Finland’s geographic remoteness was also recognized as a limiting factor as it separates the diaspora 
from Kurdish communities in Europe. Acting through the Finnish civil society and political system 
was seen as the legitimate way of mobilization by the respondents, which compliments prior claims 
by Soysal, Brown and Baser that systems more open to cooperation and lobbying by minority groups 
channel diaspora activism through the official system. The diaspora groups however preferred 
different strategies based on their position towards the Finnish state and the political system, as the 
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Apoists who had a more antagonistic position towards the state preferred to work through 
transnational and civil society networks while restraining for participating to Finnish party politics 
and the nationalists endorsed activity in the political system. This adds to Sheffer’s claim that stateless 
diasporas are more prone to cooperate through the political system of the host state that the 
cooperation depends on diaspora groups affiliation with transnational movements, which might prefer 
strategy that excludes political participation, and their position to the host states.  
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